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“When the legend becomes fact, print the legend.” 1
The most prestigious prize in the early years of the Cold War was the West Euro-
pean left. Socialists, communists and the Soviet Union had suffered tremen-
dously under Nazi occupation, repression and genocide. The communist left in 
France, Belgium and Italy looked favorably to the Soviet Union. In the unfolding 
political antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union both sides 
were fighting to win over this group. Would the West European left turn to their 
ideological neighbors on the left and their interpretation of history and society or 
would they follow the American example of a modern liberal consumer society, 
of consensus capitalism and a modern welfare state? Whoever succeeded in this 
competition for loyalty would be able to determine politics in Western Europe for 
a long time.2
Culture and cultural patterns were crucial in generating loyalty to one system 
or another. The Cold War was a cultural as much as a military conflict, whose 
“full arsenal” included literature, cinema, music, and art, and whose foot sol-
diers were “ballerinas, violinists, poets, actors, playwrights, painters, compos-
ers, comedians, and chess players.”3 Movies were essential for the entertainment 
of the middle and the underclasses, particularly for the young. The Lorraine 
Communist youth watched movies showcasing comrade Joseph Stalin, but also 
1 Maxwell Scott, The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, Carleton Young, (John Ford; 1962; Holly-
wood, California: Paramount Pictures).
2 See Julia Angster, “Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie: die Westernisierung von SPD 
und DGB” (Zugl. Tübingen, University, Diss., 2000, Oldenbourg, 2003); Abraham Boxhoorn, The 
Cold War and the rift in the governments of national unity. Belgium, France, and Italy in the spring 
of 1947, a comparison, Amsterdamse historische reeks (Amsterdam: Historisch Seminarium van 
de Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1993); Alessandro Brogi, Confronting America. The Cold War be-
tween the United States and the Communists in France and Italy (Chapel Hill: Univ of North Car-
olina Press, 2011). 
3 David Caute, The dancer defects. The struggle for cultural supremacy during the Cold War (Ox-
ford [u.a.]: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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icons of the Hollywood entertainment industry like Humphrey Bogart.4 The Lor-
raine miner’s youth followed culturally not one consistent model, but rather two 
opposing models, those of comrade Stalin and of Humphrey Bogart’s coolness.
This paradox leads to some general observations: First, the social and politi-
cal background did not determine the cultural role models that young communist 
workers followed in a free society. The concept of culture is not identical with 
political attitudes. Stalin himself loved Hollywood movies, especially Western. 
Seen from the vantage point of cultural history, the readers and the viewers did 
not have one cultural imaginary but several. Culture and politics are not related 
directly, but rather in indirect and subtle ways of coding and displacement. There 
are limits to the impact of the Cold War political antagonism on culture. They 
seem to follow different logics and can only partly and temporarily be identified. 
Clearly there are limits to the cultural representation of the Cold War. Conse-
quently, the cultural history of the Cold War does not simply have the task to 
explain success and failure in the political-cultural enterprise of seducing certain 
social groups into political loyalty. It rather deals – at least in the 1950s and 1960s 
– with hybridity and ambiguity of conflicting preferences. Historical actors did 
not neatly fit into the bipolar schemes of the Cold War. They could oppose the 
United States in Vietnam and embrace Hollywood movies and music from New 
York. One could adore Stalin and Bogart. Cold War culture was not a container 
of cultural attitudes and political preferences, which were being constantly syn-
chronized by Cold War cultural institutions. Therefore, Cold War culture varied 
also from country to country. It meant something different for Germans, French 
and Britains. Accordingly, we can speak of many Cold War cultures in plural. 
“The Cold War,” “la guerre froide” and “Kalter Krieg” is not the same, but denote 
different Cold War cultures.5 
Secondly, Cold War culture cannot be found alone in those cultural artifacts 
that represent the Cold War, but also in entertainment culture or in children’s 
films. We can find Cold War culture and places where we wouldn’t expect them 
to be. The film version of Rudyard Kipling’s novel Kim from 1950 involved a clear 
Cold War ideology by propagating the narrative of the British Empire as the 
advance of “civilization” against the leftist de-colonizers.6 The Cold War was in 
4 See Fabrice Montebello, “Joseph Staline et Humphrey Bogart: l’hommage des ouvriers. Essai 
sur la construction sociale de la figure du ‘heros’ en milieu ouvrier,” Politix 24 (1993).
5 Annette Vowinckel, Marcus M. Payk, and Thomas Lindenberger, Cold War Cultures. Perspec-
tives on Eastern and Western Societies (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012).
6 Ian Wojcik-Andrews and Jerry Phillips, “Telling Tales to Children: The Pedagogy of Empire in 
MGM’s Kim and Disney’s Aladdin,” The Lion and the Unicorn 20, no. 1 (1996).
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this literary-political tradition seen as a new chapter in an old story, i.e. the “Great 
Game,” the conflict between Britain and Russia in Central Asia in the late 19th 
century. The imagery of the British Empire inspired Cold War culture to such an 
extent that some even referred to the Cold War as “Great Game II.”
Thirdly, there is a social dimension to this, since genres like children’s books 
or movies attracted different audiences than political speeches. We look at least 
at two dynamics. Lowbrow was brought into the fold by Cold War mass culture 
such as movies, lowbrow literature or mass print culture. But that didn’t mean 
that the more aspirational middlebrow classes were lost. Cold War culture came 
in different codes, styles and formats. Building on prewar experiences middle-
brow institutions such as book clubs (Saturday Review of Literature, Book of the 
Month Club) and new magazine formats as Life and the New Yorker conveyed 
a sense of Western culture ex- or implicitly set against communism. Cold War 
culture thereby fed into the pursuit of greater cultural prestige through products 
and memberships within the middle classes.7 Narratives of the West and the East, 
of freedom and egalitarianism were not restricted to high culture but also part of 
low- and middlebrow culture.8
A plethora of topics in the cultural Cold War has been studied, ranging from 
the arts and cultural institutions to gender aspects, vacation patterns and the 
postwar polio crisis.9 Whoever refers to the fine arts, to highbrow or lowbrow 
culture, to intellectual history or political semantics, to iconography or gender 
roles in the context of Cold War culture uses dissimilar concepts of culture. The 
analytical approach and the questions in these cases are different, sometimes 
even incompatible. A cultural history of the Cold War that is focusing on the arts, 
literature, music, sculpture, painting etc. is obviously looking at a different Cold 
War from the studies that employ a concept of culture centered around institu-
tions like publishing houses, universities or museums, worldviews, intellectual 
paradigms or aesthetic styles. What an exhibition in London has called the “con-
scription of the arts”10 focuses on a Cold War that is different from an intellectual 
7 Greg Barnhisel, Cold War modernists: art, literature, and American cultural diplomacy, 1946–
1959 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).
8 Cf. Sabina Mihelj, “Negotiating cold war culture at the crossroads of east and west: uplifting 
the working people, entertaining the masses, cultivating the nation,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 53, no. 3: 509–31.
9 See Simon Willmetts, “Quiet Americans: The CIA and Early Cold War Hollywood Cinema,” Jour-
nal of American Studies 47, no. 1 (2013); Christopher Endy, Cold War holidays. American tourism in 
France, The new Cold War history (Chapel Hill, NC [u.a.]: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). 
10 Muriel Blaive, “Utopian Visions: The ‘Cold War’ and its Political Aesthetics,” Zeithistorische 
Forschungen 5 (2008).
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history of Herman Kahn and the RAND Corporation.11 Others have found the 
cultural Cold War in science fiction, in Western movies and the changing role 
of cowboys.12 Nearly every topic of cultural analysis has been used to narrate 
a cultural history of the Cold War. These studies give a sense of many different 
Cold Wars. 
Cold War culture in the 1950s shared one characteristic: modernism. The 
Cold War was a conflict between different concepts of modernity, not only varying 
to block affinity, but to many of the variables. Cold War modernism is a concept 
first applied in the arts. It encompassed expressionism and abstract art, jazz, new 
ways of designing as well as architecture. But the point for Cold War culture was, 
that modernism always had political implications. Here lies the problem which 
this article wants to address. In the interwar years, modernist culture as well as 
artists had aligned themselves with the political left in rejecting tradition and 
bourgeois society. That had become especially clear in the Spanish campaign in 
the late 1930s. When modernism was to be a common denominator for a Western 
zone it had to be recoded and made compatible with a democratic, capitalist bour-
geois system. Recoding modernism in the 1950s did not simply mean better distri-
bution to fit new audiences. It also meant giving new meaning to modernism and 
modernity. That was of particular importance for Germany, Austria and Italy, the 
countries on the losing side in 1945. Modernism stood politically for the enemy 
in Nazi Germany as well as in Mussolini’s Italy. Aesthetically Nazi industrial (not 
public!) architecture used modernism just the same way as Western societies.13 
Whereas both societies voluntarily embraced democracy, getting rid of one’s cul-
tural past was another matter. But bringing Germany, Austria and Italy into the 
Western fold essentially meant introducing a cultural style to these societies that 
stood for everything they had abhorred 20 years earlier. The problem was the link 
between democracy and modernism.
11 See Bernd Greiner, “Macht und Geist im Kalten Krieg. Bilanz und Ausblick,” in: id. et al. eds, 
Macht und Geist im Kalten Krieg, Hamburg 2011, 7–27.
12 See David Seed, American science fiction and the Cold War: literature and film (Edinburgh: Ed-
inburgh University Press, 1999); Andrea Weiss, “Cold War Femme: Lesbianism, National Identity, 
and Hollywood Cinema,” Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 3 (2012); Stanley Corkin, “Cowboys 
and Free Markets: Post-World War II Westerns and U.S. Hegemony,” Cinema Journal 39, no. 3 
(2000); Nicholas J. Cull, “British Cinema and the Cold War: The State, Propaganda and Consen-
sus,” Cold War History 3, no. 1 (2002); Jacqueline Foertsch, Enemies within: the Cold War and the 
AIDS crisis in literature, film, and culture (Urbana [u.a.]: University of Illinois Press, 2001).
13 David Gartman, From autos to architecture fordism and architectural aesthetics in the twenti-
eth century (New York, NY: Princeton Architectural Press, 2009), 132–35.
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In the following remarks I try to sketch out a meta-perspective on Cold War 
culture. The central thesis of the following paragraphs is that the research on the 
Cold War heavily depends on the notion of culture it employs. From both notions 
of culture follow different perspectives on Cold War culture:
 – Culture was about representation. Culture can be seen as being informed and 
to a certain degree steered by the Cold War, its antagonisms, its abundant 
quest for loyalty among different social groups. Culture in this sense is a way 
to foster loyalty, to make claims and to counter others.
 – Culture was about producing new meanings of the Cold War instead of repeat-
ing and distributing preexisting ones. Culture refers to looking onto the Cold 
War, recoding its meaning and engaging in critique, parody and satire. Its 
dominant modes were distancing and reflexivity. 
Cold War culture was both. It got a Cold War message out and it was self-reflexive 
in that it reflected on the Cold War and recoded its meaning in new ways. The 
coexistence of representation and recoding denote a time around 1960, where it 
was unclear whether literature, painting, music, and academic life would keep 
distributing Cold War messages or whether they would reflect on the Cold War 
in new ways. The following paragraphs are particularly interested in these years 
between 1955 and 1968 and their ambiguity in Cold War culture. 
This distinction between representation and recoding is meant heuristically 
to look into the various functions of Cold War culture. In the topics under investi-
gation these two notions are in many cases both present and at work. Culture was 
representing something else and at the same time recoding the Cold War. This is 
obvious in the notion of the Cold War itself, which not only represented a political 
antagonism between the US and the USSR but also recoded a few years after the 
end of World War II the hitherto dominating dichotomy of “fascism versus anti-
fascism” into a new antagonism. At the center of Cold War culture stood memory, 
i.e. recoding the memory of the shared war against Nazi-Germany. Intellectual 
tools like totalitarianism reframed the discontinuity of the Cold War to World War 
II as continuity. There were others, most prominently modernism.
One caveat on Cold War culture must be made in advance. “Cold War” and 
“Cold War culture” are terms that are used in the sources mostly in the Western 
hemisphere. The common man in Eastern Europe rather described the era between 
1947 and 1991 as “life under communism.”14 A cultural history should be aware 
of this structuring difference. “Culture” as well as “Cold War” are analytical con-
14 Blaive, 320; Muriel Blaive and Berthold Molden, Grenzfälle österreichische und tschechische 
Erfahrungen am eisernen Vorhang (Weitra: Verl. Bibliothek der Provinz, 2009).
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cepts applied by historians, not expressions that are evident in the sources. The 
Cold War is no longer simply an explanans, but rather an explanandum, a concept 
that has to be made visible and reconstructed.
The Cold War itself was a metaphor and makes sense only in a certain vocab-
ulary and perspective.15 The effort to embed the Cold War in cultural history may 
be expressed by the term “Cold War culture.”16 Culture refers then to the patterns 
and worldviews that gave meaning to the term “Cold War” and made it possible. 
Since the patterns came from different national, social, political and religious 
backgrounds, there were many “Cold War cultures.”17
1 Cold War Culture as Representation
The best-known form of the cultural Cold War is the representation of the polit-
ical conflict in the arts. The notion of culture clearly implies representation. On 
the theoretical side it is just unclear what is being represented.18 On the political 
side of Cold War culture we encounter many uses of culture to represent the Cold 
War antagonism from one side or the other. Cold War politics made use of culture 
to seek loyalty in Western societies, and to counter the claims of the other side. 
Culture was to represent something political, it had to transmit essentially polit-
ical claims about the US, the West, Western society and Western culture. Within 
this Cold War usage of culture, we are dealing with at least two dimensions of 
culture: cultural practices and artifacts on the one hand and a political notion of 
what culture means on the other hand. This meaning of culture is administered 
by Cold War politics and only by them. The problem arises, that cultural practices 
run into a contradiction when they are not allowed to produce their own meaning. 
An example in place is the Congress for Cultural Freedom trying “to nudge the 
intelligentsia of Western Europe away from its lingering fascination with Marxism 
and Communism towards a view more accommodating to ‘the American way.’” 
The CCF had offices in 35 countries, employed dozens of personnel, published 
15 Anders Stephanson, “Fourteen notes on the very concept of the Cold War,” H-Diplo Essays 
(2007).
16 This differs from the use of the term “Cold War culture” in: Gordon Johnston, “Revisiting the 
cultural Cold War,” Social History 35, no. 3 (2010).
17 As Annette Vowinckel’s book rightly emphasizes. Vowinckel, Payk, and Lindenberger.
18 Stuart Hall and Open University, Representation: cultural representations and signifying prac-
tices, Culture, media, and identities (London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage in association with 
the Open University, 1997).
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over twenty prestigious magazines, held art exhibitions, owned a news and fea-
tures service, organized high-profile international conferences, and rewarded 
musicians and artists with prizes and public performances.19 The left liberal 
members were of particular importance for the US, since the political left was to 
be gained for the cause of Western liberal democracy. Among the initial founding 
members were such luminaries of the literary world as François Bondy, Irving 
Brown, James Burnham, Sidney Hook, Michael Josselson, Arthur Koestler, Melvin 
Lasky, Nicolas Nabokov and Ignazio Silone. They all shared a leftist, in the case of 
Koestler and Silone even communist history. They all had distanced themselves 
from communism. Their strategic aim was to win the hearts and minds of their 
former peers. The meeting in Andlau near Strasbourg in September 1951 sought to 
counter communist claims in the intellectual field: 
1. How do we reach the mind of the communist intellectual? 
2. The Diamat (Dialectical Materialism) is a persistent challenge of the free world. What 
are the ways and means to respond to this challenge and what common anti-Diamat 
action can be devised for the intellectuals of the free world?20
The CIA financed periodicals of the CCF, which were designed to disseminate 
liberal values among the leftist intelligentsia. Among the journals were the 
German “Der Monat,” edited by Melvin Lasky, the French periodical “Preuves,” 
the Italian Journal “Tempo presente” and the British magazine Encounter. When 
the military-intellectual collaboration became publicly known in 1967, it met 
sharp criticism. The Ford Foundation took over the financial responsibilities from 
the CIA, but the public impact of the CCF declined from then on.21 
Another way to win over the intellectuals was academic research of Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union. U.S. institutions were crucial in developing Centers 
19 Frances Stonor Saunders, Who paid the piper? The CIA and the cultural Cold War (London: 
Granta Books, 1999); Michael Hochgeschwender, Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongress für Kul-
turelle Freiheit und die Deutschen, Ordnungssysteme (München: Oldenbourg, 1998).
20 Giles Scott-Smith, “The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the end of ideology and the 1955 
Milan Conference: ‘defining parameters of discourse’,” Journal of Contemporary History 37, no. 
3 (2002): 438.
21 See Christopher Lasch, The agony of the American left, 1. Vintage Books ed ed. (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1969), 64–111; Elena Aronova, “The Congress for Cultural Freedom, Minerva, and 
the Quest for Instituting ‘‘Science Studies’’ in the Age of Cold War,” Minerva 50 (2012); Peter Cole-
man, The liberal conspiracy. The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the struggle for the mind of 
postwar Europe (New York [u.a.]: Free Press [u.a.], 1989); G. Scott-Smith, “‘A radical Democratic 
political offensive’: Melvin J. Lasky, Der Monat and the Congress for Cultural Freedom,” Journal 
of Contemporary History 35, no. 2 (2000).
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for Eastern European Studies, Ukrainian and Russian Centers, that were founded 
e.g. at Harvard University (1948), the Free University in West-Berlin (Osteuro-
pa-Institut, 1951), in Amsterdam (Russland Instituut, 1948) or at the University 
of Fribourg in Switzerland (1957). Academic research went hand in hand with 
the distribution and dissemination of anticommunist politics. US institutions like 
the Ford Foundation or the Rockefeller Foundation relied on highly motivated 
actors like the Jesuit Gustav Wetter S.J, or the Dominican Professor of Philosophy 
Joseph Maria Bocheński, who not only founded the Osteuropa-Institut in 1957 in 
Fribourg, but also the periodical Studies in Soviet Thought and the book series 
Sovietica.22
The CCF as well as these centers and institutes represented the Cold War 
conflict as between freedom and repression. The 1953 conference of the CCF 
in Hamburg was on “Science and Freedom.” In his opening remarks the social 
democratic mayor of Hamburg Max Brauer made it clear that science could only 
blossom in freedom, not under state authority. The Milan conference in 1955 sim-
ilarly focused on “The Future of Freedom.”23
For others the anticommunist message of freedom required depoliticization 
and the end of the age of ideologies. The historian H. Stuart Hughes argued in 1951 
for “the end of political ideology,” brought about by the threat of communism: 
In such a situation the ideological differences, the issues dividing capitalist and partly 
socialist states – that now characterize the Western coalition – may cease to be of much 
practical importance. Pressed by the same necessities, these states will doubtless begin to 
resemble each other. 
Stuart wanted the old political divisions to be forgotten in the interest of defend-
ing basic freedoms.24 But instead of depoliticizing the conflict, “the end of ideol-
ogy” (Daniel Bell) reinforced the dominant Cold War polarities.25 
The quest for cultural hegemony in the Cold War addressed primarily literary 
circles, since in the 1950s literature was still viewed as the leading art genre in 
Central Europe. One characteristic of Cold War culture in the 1950s was that it 
22 See The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report 1957, New York 1957, 235; Josef Maria Bocheńs-
ki, Die kommunistische Ideologie und die Würde, Freiheit und Gleichheit der Menschen im Sinne 
des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23.5.1949 (Freiburg 1954).
23 See Scott-Smith, “A Radical Democratic Political Offensive,” 438.
24 H. Stuart Hughes, ‘The End of Political Ideology’, Measure, 2 (Spring 1951): 153–4, 156.
25 See Thomas H. Schaub, American fiction in the Cold War, History of American thought and 
culture (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 23; Daniel Bell, The end of ideology. 
On the exhaustion of political ideas in the fifties (Glencoe/Ill.: Free Press, 1960). 
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was largely set in the world of print culture. The war of ideas was fought out in 
the Gutenberg galaxy. This is why the material side of print culture, new editions 
in paperback, book clubs for the distribution of books and in Eastern Europe the 
allotment of paper quotas for publishing houses played such an important role. 
Print was the prime medium of propaganda and of dissent on both sides in the 
Cold War. The Reader’s Digest made high quality literature of cultural and polit-
ical content available to middle class consumers. For its editor David Reed Read-
er’s Digest was one of the “three great international institutions,” together with 
the Catholic Church and the Communist Party. The Cold War saw the “mighti-
est outpouring of mass market books of every kind.” Whereas books had been 
sold in bookstores, paperbacks were on sale also in drug stores and newspaper 
dealers. The anti-Communist print culture of the 1950s in the United States 
relied heavily on networks; on small publishers offering quantity discounts 
often leading to prices of 20 cents per book. Reading groups, educational orga-
nizations, and periodicals provided the political guidance for their mass audi-
ence. Many of these books did not even rely on bookstores or drugstores but 
rather on mail-order catalogs. In addition, leading conservative anti-Communist 
authors provided their audience with comprehensive reading lists. Because of 
the impact of print culture, the anti-Communist movement survived the demise 
of Sen. Joseph McCarthy. 
The political culture of Communism as well as of the Soviet Union also relied 
on print culture. Nikita Khrushchev and his allies ensured that the entry in the 
Great Soviet Encyclopedia on Lavrentiy Beria, a rival in the quest for power after 
Stalin’s death in 1953, was replaced by a larger entry on the “Bering Sea” using 
a “small knife or razor blade.” Print culture could produce both, loyalty and 
dissent, in the United States as well as abroad. The leftist students critique of 
United States politics rested entirely on the righteousness of print. The students 
believed in the transformative and democratic power of print. “Once a person had 
read the truth, that person would naturally become an active democratic citizen 
with the power to resist the injustice and intolerance of life the United States.”26
The political orientation of leftist writers was of particular importance, since 
they were often aligned with political parties, in France with the communist 
party PCF. Intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, René Char and 
André Breton were members of the communist party and consequently declined 
to take part in the CCF International Conference in Paris 1952, whereas W. H. 
26 Greg Barnhisel and Catherine Turner, Pressing the fight print, propaganda, and the Cold War, 
Studies in print culture and the history of the book (Amherst, Mass. [u.a.]: University of Massa-
chusetts Press, 2010), 4, 10, 12, 19. 
Brought to you by | Université de Fribourg
Authenticated | siegfried.weichlein@unifr.ch author's copy
Download Date | 2/8/17 10:14 AM
28   Siegfried Weichlein
Auden, Czesław Milosz, Ignazio Silone, André Malraux and William Faulkner 
did. For the members of the PCF among the French literary elite the Hungar-
ian uprising in 1956 was a caesura. Many of them left the party. Khrushchev’s 
speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 further 
demotivated the communist intellectuals. Among those intellectuals leaving the 
PCF were François Furet, Albert Camus and many others later turning more and 
more liberal. German writers responded to the uprisings in 1953 and 1956 differ-
ently. Besides their vehement protest against the Russian troops, members of the 
“Group 47” – never in tune with Marxism – were more concerned with national 
unification and the Nazi crimes.27
Besides print culture visual culture with popular movies was on the rise. 
Films played a crucial role in the cultural Cold War, because they reached a 
broader audience.28 Movies took up contemporary issues like the suppression of 
the Hungarian Catholic Church after February 1949, when Cardinal Mindszenty 
was sentenced in a show trial to lifelong prison.29 At least three Cold War movies 
told his story: Guilty of Treason (Felix Feist 1950), The Prisoner (Peter Glenville 
1955) starring Alec Guinness and in 1966 Mission: Impossible.30 They all portrayed 
Cardinal Mindszenty through the cultural trope of a martyr. The movies appealed 
emotionally to an American and Western audience while denouncing the Soviet 
atheist policies and the suppression of the church. Thereby older Catholic anti-
communism was enlisted for the US, not a natural ally of the Catholic Church.31
The movies on Mindszenty represented the enemy as something abstract: 
the communist system, atheism and dictatorship. The plot represented a bipolar 
27 See Anita Krätzer, Das Amerikabild im Prosawerk von Max Frisch. Studien zum Amerikabild in 
der neueren deutschen Literatur. Max Frisch – Uwe Johnson – Hans Magnus Enzensberger und das 
“Kursbuch” (Bern, Frankfurt: University of Michigan, 1982). 
28 See Tony Shaw, British cinema and the Cold War. The state, propaganda and consensus (Lon-
don: Tauris, 2001); Hollywood’s cold war (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007); David 
W. Ellwood, Rob Kroes, and Gian Piero Brunetta, Hollywood in Europe: experiences of a cultural 
hegemony, European contributions to American studies (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994).
29 See Tony Shaw, “Martyrs, Miracles, and Martians: Religion and Cold War Cinematic Propa-
ganda in the 1950s,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 2 (2002).
30 The Soviet-made “Conspiracy of the Doomed” (Michail Kalatozov 1950) also referred to 
Mindszentys story. See ibid., 15.
31 See ibid., 14–19; for cold war movies cf. Thomas Patrick Doherty, Cold War, cool medium: 
television, McCarthyism, and American culture, Film and culture (New York, N.Y. [u.a.]: Columbia 
University Press, 2003); Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Cold War fantasies: film, fiction, and foreign policy 
(Lanham, Md. [u.a.]: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Seed; John Pollard, “The Vatican, Italy and 
the Cold War,” in Religion and the Cold War, ed. Dianne Kirby (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), 109.
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structure of the conflict, with morality standing against immorality, Christian 
values against atheism. The message was clear: A devout Catholic could sin-
gle-handedly resist Communist dictatorship and brainwashing. The particular 
evil quality of the enemy was essential. The communist interrogator did not resort 
to torture, but rather to psychological means when he tried to break the Cardi-
nal’s will. The political message suggested that totalitarian systems like the Third 
Reich and the Soviet Union all resorted to “robot like enslavement.”32 
Films were used to intervene politically in the Italian elections of April 1948. 
Immediately before the ballot, the movie Ninotchka (Ernst Lubitsch, 1939), an 
anti-Communist comedy about the Soviet communist nomenclatura starring 
Greta Garbo, was released in Italy to counter the slim lead of the Italian Com-
munist Party (PCI) in the polls.33 For the communist side winning the national 
elections was a lesson to be learned from fascism, the Second World War and 
the resistenza. Their learning the lesson of fascism and World War II primarily 
involved the intellectuals. The liberal-conservative parties drew another conse-
quence from former dictatorships. That lesson was – in their idiom – to resist 
Soviet dictatorship and to affirm the values of liberal democracy. The PCI tried to 
win over the intellectuals; the Hollywood movie went for the common man. The 
PCI finally lost the elections. 
The link between culture and politics seems particularly obvious in cultural 
diplomacy. It is an endeavor to “manage the international environment through 
making (one’s) cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or 
facilitating cultural transmissions abroad.”34 Examples came from the US and the 
USSR. The Bolshoi Theatre was sent as a cultural envoy to the West, repeating its 
tours many times in the 1950s and 1960s. The company’s shows drew the masses 
and were a guaranteed success. Also, classical musicians and sportsmen repre-
sented the Soviet Union abroad. Countless initiatives showed the public diplo-
macy of the USSR.35 Historical research on the cultural Cold War has come up 
with many examples for the “conscription of the arts” in the service of one side 
or the other.36
32 Shaw, “Martyrs, Miracles, and Martians: Religion and Cold War Cinematic Propaganda in the 
1950s,” 17.
33 See Brogi.
34 Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, “The model of cultural diplomacy. Power, dis-
tance, and the promise of civil society,” in Searching for a cultural diplomacy, ed. Jessica Gien-
ow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (New York [u.a.]: Berghahn Books, 2010), 14.
35 See Tobias Rupprecht, “Socialist high modernity and global stagnation: a shared history of 
Brazil and the Soviet Union during the Cold War,” Journal of Global History 6, no. 3 (2011): 519.
36 Claire F. Fox, Making Art Panamerican cultural policy and the Cold War (Minneapolis, Minn.: 
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Was culture just an extension of politics in the Cold War or were its dissimi-
larities from politics more important than its similarities? Frances Stonor Saun-
ders and Scott Lucas argue that cultural involvement in Cold War issues was more 
or less directed by political interests.37 Contemporaries like the American writer 
Paul Goodman observed similarly: 
The  current disease  is  to  make  Cold War  capital  out of  everything,  no matter  what. We 
cannot dedicate a building of Frank Lloyd Wright’s in New York without our Ambassador to 
the United Nations pointing out that such an architect could not have flourished in Russia.38
Nearly everything in the cultural world has been explained via the influence of 
the Cold War, including dance, college football or the post war polio crisis, read 
as a manifestation of the body politic’s own affliction.39 This brings up the ques-
tion, whether there was a cultural sphere in the 1950s and 60s that was indepen-
dent from the Cold War. Not everything can be attributed to the influence of the 
Cold War. David Caute has taken issue with the “constant determination to find a 
Cold War ‘smoking gun’ behind all cultural activity. … At a certain point ‘culture’ 
collapses under the weight of investigation into merely another term for ‘propa-
ganda’.” 40 Others like Jessica Gienow-Hecht admit political machinations, but 
argue nevertheless for a (semi-)autonomous sphere of culture.41 
University of Minnesota Press, 2013); Sarah Davies, “The Soft Power of Anglia: British Cold War 
Cultural Diplomacy in the USSR,” Contemporary British History 27, no. 3 (2013); Yale Richmond, 
Practicing public diplomacy: a Cold War odyssey, vol. 5 (Berghahn Books, 2008); Jessica C. E. 
Gienow-Hecht, “‘How Good Are We?’ Culture and the Cold War,” Intelligence & National Security 
18, no. 2 (2003); Naima Prevots, Dance for export: cultural diplomacy and the Cold War, Studies in 
dance history (Hanover, NH [u.a.]: University Press of New England [u.a.], 1998).
37 See Saunders; Scott Lucas, Freedom’s war. The American crusade against the Soviet Union 
(New York: New York University Press, 1999); Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam, The cul-
tural Cold War in Western Europe 1945 – 1960, Cass series Studies in intelligence (London [u.a.]: 
Cass, 2003), 4. 
38 Barnhisel, 25.
39 Christina Ezrahi, “Dance as a Lens on American Cold War Culture,” (2015); Benjamin Phil-
lips, “College Football and American Culture in the Cold War Era,” (Malden, USA2010); Foertsch; 
“‘A Battle of Silence’: Women’s Magazines and the Polio Crisis in Post-war UK and USA,” in Amer-
ican Cold war culture, ed. Douglas Field (Ediunburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2005).
40 Scott-Smith and Krabbendam, 4.
41 It constituted “the transmission of ideas, dreams, mores, traditions, and beliefs from one 
generation to the next, from one continent to another, one group of people to another in the 
form of schools, galleries, orchestra halls, shopping centers, department stores and information 
centers.” Jessica Gienow-Hecht, “Culture and the Cold War in Europe,” in Cambridge History of 
the Cold War, ed. Odd Arne Westad Melvyn P. Leffler (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010), 398–99.
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Indeed, Cold War culture did not invent its genres and formats, nor did it 
govern all aspects of cultural life. The cultural Cold War produced a lot, but hardly 
anything new. The genres of the cultural Cold War where established in the inter-
war years with science fiction in place already in the 1920s. The media of the 
cultural Cold War including TV were technological innovations predating World 
War II. Anti-communism predated the Cold War so that the Cold War can be seen 
as one chapter of the history of the East-West antagonism since 1917.42 Besides 
Cold War culture existed cultural, even countercultural movements as the youth 
movement or the student movement, the women’s and ecological movements, 
that were largely independent of the Cold War. Not everything was part of the 
cultural Cold War. Cold War culture was in many ways part of bigger stories. 
2 Cold War Modernities
Cold War culture tapped into broader and into older themes, most prominently 
into modernism and modernity. The Cold War has been explained more generally 
as a conflict between conflicting models of modernity. Modernism played a major 
role in the Soviet Union as well as in the West between the wars.43 Its ubiquitous 
role was such that modernism and modernity served themselves as a meta-frame 
for capitalism and communism. Both claimed to be the better, if not the only way 
to modernity. Whereas in the 1920s and the 1930s modernism took on a rather 
leftist outlook, rejecting traditional and bourgeois society. Modernism was strong 
in the US as well as in the USSR. Modernity and modernism were older than the 
Cold War, they preceded and outlived it. Still: “the Cold War became the apothe-
osis of 20th century modernity, visually as well as socially.”44 
The autonomy of the arts stood at the center of the 1950s modernism. It was 
spelled out theoretically in aesthetical polemics and practically in the fine arts. In 
the theoretical debate art was seen as the opposite of politics. “Art is not political” 
was used in an anti-communist way to counter uses of art as propaganda: Art is 
not propaganda. Modernist aesthetics distanced itself from propaganda as it was 
observed in mass culture. Modernism should be high art. High art was serious 
42 Jost Dülffer, Europa im Ost-West-Konflikt 1945–1991 (München: Oldenbourg, 2004).
43 Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and catastrophe: the passing of mass utopia in East and West 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
44 Odd Arne Westad, “The Cold War and the international history of the twentieth century,” 
in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, ed. Odd Arbe Westad Melvyn P. Leffler (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2010), 10, 17.
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and no propaganda at all, went the claim. This argument against propaganda ran 
against communist propaganda. Since communist politics was seen as pervading 
every aspect of society and culture, resisting communism meant resisting poli-
tics. Being anti-propaganda, anti-mass culture and apolitical or even anti-politi-
cal went hand in hand. Politics was perceived as a threat to art. Anti-communist 
aesthetic ideology in the 1950s insisted, that freedom implied autonomy of the 
arts, a point the New Critics and New York intellectuals were making over and 
over. The social function of the arts was seen in their relative autonomy in relation 
to politics. Literature as all other fine arts was beyond politics, “but by moving 
beyond politics it fulfilled an essentially political task.” This asserted the political 
impact of apoliticality.45 
What modernism was in the realm of culture, modernity was in the politi-
cal Cold War. The Cold War has been described as a conflict between opposing 
concepts of modernity, that of liberal capitalism and that of socialism. This is the 
basic line of Odd Arne Westad’s and Melvyn Leffler’s three volume “Cambridge 
History of the Cold War”. The Cold War was essentially a “conflict between the 
two versions of western modernity that socialism and liberal capitalism seemed 
to offer.” The intensity of the Cold War “was created by each side’s conviction 
that they represented the last, best hope for the rescue of a rational, transcending 
modernity from the horrors of war and nationalist conflict.” Both camps shared 
a rational vision of society, opposed to violence, nationalism, and war. That both 
stood for conflicting versions of the same modernist paradigm was made patently 
clear in the Third World. From the perspective of the new African states the Cold 
War was a 
conflict between the two versions of Western modernity that socialism and liberal capi-
talism seemed to offer. The globalization of the Cold War that these struggles led to both 
intensified the superpower conflict through international interventions and increased the 
cost of the competition, while destroying many of the societies in which the battles were 
carried out.46
What then was Cold War modernism? It was a contested cultural term shared by 
both sides.47 “It is commonplace for the cultural Cold War to be viewed as an aes-
thetic combat zone between realism and modernism: differing rationales for the 
45 Roland Végső, The naked communist. Cold War modernism and the politics of popular culture 
(New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2013), 95.
46 Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, The Cambridge History of the Cold War Volume 1: 
Origins, 1945–1962 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10.
47 For modernization utopias within the Soviet Union cf. Buck-Morss.
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production, consumption and judgment of art, music, literature and so forth.”48 
But Cold War modernism could be found in the East as well as in the West, since 
both shared “early cinema, urban architecture, mass leaders, media manipula-
tion, the mass-utopian myth of industrial ‘modernization’ itself.”49 Already in 
the interwar years the science fiction genre had favored the demonization of the 
enemy. “In the 1920s, the contrast of ‘communist heaven’ and ‘capitalist hell’ was 
a generic theme in Soviet science fiction, projecting onto the ‘other’ all of the 
negative aspects of industrial society.” After the Second World War, US TV series 
on ‘alien invaders’ inscribed the fear of Communism into science fiction fanta-
sies.50 More broadly, modernism linked various fields together, that had formerly 
been seen as disconnected. It was a powerful tool to see architecture, politics, 
the military and city planning, defense needs and the mobilization of the labor 
resources through one lense. “Seen through this historical prism, the great Cold 
War enemies, while having been truly dangerous to each other, appear as in fact 
close relatives.”51
The two sides shared central aspects of Cold War modernism. “Both the 
United States and the Soviet Union placed education at the center of their social 
systems in a way never before seen among great powers.”52 Education was no 
longer a privilege for the cultural and political elite, but a characteristic of the 
broader society. The United States as well as the Soviet Union educated young 
students from Third World countries and from their allies in Europe. “Against the 
traditions of privilege, heritage, family and locality, both Soviets and Americans 
offered a modern and revolutionary alternative.” For Americans this meant the 
“globalization of the United States immigrant perspective, in which people could 
choose the communities to which they wished to belong,” for the Soviets it meant 
the universalization of the “Bolshevik’s hatred for ‘old Russia’, considered back-
ward and underdeveloped.” 53 The ideological focus on anti-privilege, modernity 
and innovation also facilitated the advancement of new social elites in East and 
West. “It made it easier for individuals to willingly seek inclusion. … Entry into 
the elites was probably more open in social terms in these two countries than in 
most others” including their allies, particularly Britain and France.54 Both sides 
48 Johnston, 291.
49 Buck-Morss, 235.
50 See John Cheng, Astounding wonder. Imagining science and science fiction in interwar 
America, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). 
51 Buck-Morss.
52 Ibid., 13.
53 Ibid., 14. 
54 Ibid., 15.
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were convinced that their vision of a modern and rational society would be suc-
cessful. The future was surely theirs. The world would unavoidably move “in the 
direction of the aims they themselves had set.”55
Modernism was one of the most prominent topics in the cultural politics 
within the Soviet sphere, being outlawed in 1948 as an outgrowth of Western pol-
itics and capitalist influence. Contrary to the official condemnation of formalism 
as bourgeois class aesthetics, modernism survived for instance in the GDR as a 
way to express social inclusion and egalitarianism. Modern design was popular 
in West as well as in East Germany. “Modern design was considered to be able to 
wipe out the national Socialist legacy which was regarded as either the apex of 
capitalism (East) or the combination of all reprehensible characteristics of Wil-
helmine culture (West).”56 Particularly the turn of the century furniture was now 
ridiculed as “Gelsenkirchener Barock.”57 Journals, discourses and practices in 
East and West Germany embraced instead a modern, Scandinavian style, since it 
was considered inclusive and egalitarian. Such modern design helped to commu-
nicate a new cultural identity after Nazi dictatorship. 
In the art world many shared the strong belief, “that art should be autono-
mous from the practice of daily life, not subject to evaluation of social or polit-
ical criteria.”58 This detachment from everyday life was aesthetically brought to 
the fore by formal elements of modernist art, particularly its techniques of rep-
resentation. “Modernism was a set of formal techniques and attitudes unique to 
each art form but sharing some important commonalities across genres: allusive-
ness, abstraction, fragmentation and indirectness, the sense of being belated 
within a cultural tradition, the subsumption of emotion under formal technique, 
the retreat of the personality of the artist into the background behind different 
‘masks’ or narrative voices, and, above all, high seriousness.”59 That high seri-
ousness was expressed in formal art language, shying away from realism as well 
as from tradition. 
Interwar modernism with its sympathies for the left had met fierce criticism 
from the political establishment in Europe. Politics in the United States as well is 
in Europe harbored well into the 1950s skepticism if not outright hostility toward 
55 Ibid., 13.
56 See Natalie Scholz and Milena Veenis, “Cold War Modernism and Post-War German Homes. 
An East-West Comparison,” in Divided dreamworlds? The cultural cold war in East and West, ed. 
Joes Segal and Peter Romijn (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2008), 160.
57 See ‘Weg von Tante Frieda’, Der Spiegel, 26 September 1951, 32–33, quoted in: Scholz, Cold 
War Modernism and Post-War German Homes, 164.
58 Barnhisel, 3.
59 Ibid.
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modernist art. Besides its aesthetical traditionalism the political establishment 
saw modernists as unreliable precisely because they insisted on their autonomy. 
Proponents of this argument often pointed to the modernists’ alignment with the 
republican and communist left in the Spanish civil war 1936–39. The communist 
air about modernism stemmed from that period and was signified by Picasso and 
his alignment with the Communist Party. When modernist artists like Picasso and 
others joined the Communist Party in 1945 this was seen as proof for the profound 
communist affiliations of modernist art.
Suspicions about the modernist art were widespread and reached beyond 
McCarthy’s campaign against supposed communists in Hollywood and the art 
world. When in 1947 President Harry Truman looked at Yasuo Kuniyoshi’s paint-
ing Circus girl resting, a part of the touring exhibition Advancing American Art 
organized by the U.S. State Department, he remarked: “If this is art, I’m a Hotten-
tot.” In a letter to Assistant Secretary of State William Benton of 2 April 1947 he 
referred to the exhibition as “the vaporings of half-naked lazy people.” He saw 
himself in complete accordance with the American people at large:
There are a great many American artists who still believe that the ability to make things 
look as they are is the first requirement of a great artist. They do not belong to the so-called 
modern school. There is no art at all in connection with the modernists, in my opinion.60
Two days after this letter, Secretary of State George Marshall ordered that the 
exhibition now in Czechoslovakia and Haiti stay in place and do not move on 
as Ambassador of US culture. Three weeks later, the Office of International 
Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) funds for 1948 were eliminated. The OIC 
had organized the exhibition.61 Marshall was deeply skeptical about spending 
“taxpayers’ money on modern art.”62 The examples for anti-modernist resent-
ment in the 1950s are legion. Harry Truman would have welcome Soviet realism 
after 1948 aesthetically, had he not been US President. Why then could modern-
ism overcome the anti-modernist opposition (even in the White House)? 
Convincing the public of modernism meant aligning modernism in some way 
with the United States. If modernism was to be brought into the Western cultural 
Cold War its more revolutionary political associations from the interwar years 
had to be replaced by “a celebration of the virtues of freedom and the assertion 
60 Quoted in: New York Times, January 20 1986.
61 Michael L. Krenn, Fall-out shelters for the human spirit: American art and the Cold War (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).
62 Greg Barnhisel, “Perspectives USA and the cultural cold war: Modernism in service of the 
state,” Modernism-Modernity 14, no. 4 (2007): 735.
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that the individual is sovereign.” 63 To align modernism to freedom would then 
mean reframing its political alliances. Modernism should serve as an argument 
about freedom as a characteristic of the US. In 1952 Alfred H. Barr Jr., New York’s 
Museum of Modern Art’s first president (1929–1944), had claimed in a New York 
Times article that realism was the preferred style of totalitarians, while abstract 
art symbolized political freedom.64
The more difficult task was to reconcile the autonomy of the arts with US 
mass culture. When Alfred Barr from the MoMA pointed to the proof of modern-
ism for a free society that was easily countered by Soviet politics pointing to the 
self-declared aloofness and elitism of abstract expressionism. Modernism indeed 
shied away from any content as well as from the masses and embraced formalism. 
Reconciling modernism’s quest for autonomy with conservative politics while at 
the same time reconciling it with mass culture proved to be the Achilles heel of 
the cultural Cold War. The tension between elitism and mass culture was tolera-
ble only as long as the modernist autonomy of the arts was an argument against 
socialist realism in the 1950s. In the decade of détente that could no longer be 
sustained. The 1960s saw a loosening of the cultural antagonism between mod-
ernism and realism. The relationship between modernism and mass culture 
was finally redefined. The 1960s and the 70s saw several attempts to reconcile 
modernism with mass culture in pop art (Roy Lichtenstein, Andy Warhol, Tom 
Wesselmann), documentary literature and interior design on a mass basis. Artists 
increasingly drew on popular and mass cultural forms and genres and overlaid 
them with modernist and avant-gardist strategies. Still viewed skeptically by con-
servative cultural critics as non-art, supermarket-art, Kitsch-art, or as a coca-col-
onization of Western Europe, it was a huge success, which led others to expect 
that this was finally bridging the gap between high-brow and low-brow forms of 
art, between modernism and the marketplace. After the high spirited modernism 
of the 1950s countered the communist claim, that the US had no high culture, the 
1960s modernism answered to the claim, that modernism was too much high-
brow, elitist and implicitly denied the masses access to art.
63 Cold War modernists: art, literature, and American cultural diplomacy, 1946–1959, 3. 
64 Russell H Bartley, “The Piper Played to Us All: Orchestrating the Cultural Cold War in the 
USA, Europe, and Latin America,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society (2001): 
580; Eva Cockroft, “Abstract Expressionism: weapon of the Cold War, Artforum, June 1974,” in 
How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art ed. Eva Cockroft and Serge Guilbaut (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1983). 
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While modernism had accused socialist realism of performing kitsch in the 
early 1950s, it was now modernism to take the same blame from conservative cul-
tural critics. Reconciling modernism with mass culture, meant that 
it was possible to imagine that art could be found as much in the arrangement of merchan-
dise in a department store window, in the graphics of a magazine advertisement, in the 
silhouette of the women’s dress, or in a streamlined kitchen appliance as in the paintings 
hanging in a museum. Suddenly the curators of exhibitions at the Museum of Modern Art 
appeared to think that when it came to his stylistic ingenuity, there was not much difference 
between the Kandinsky canvas and a Kalvinator refrigerator. 65
The clash between modernism and realism was fought differently in every 
country. Modernism lost the connotation of rebellion. Beginning in the 1940s and 
more broadly in the 1950s it became part of the American cultural establishment. 
In Europe that came later. One reason for this shift was the influence of Amer-
icanization in Europe, increasing after 1945 when Germany, Austria and Italy 
embraced US culture. The postwar economic boom and the rise of the welfare 
state in the 1950s reduced resentments against American consumer society. 
“Consensus capitalism” or “consensus liberalism” became a notion that even the 
Social democratic left could agree on. It integrated unions as well as socialist 
parties into Western political systems, from which they had been excluded by 
liberal elites in the interwar years. Even politicians like Willy Brandt adopted the 
cultural style of Kennedy with home stories and a public role of his wife.66 
Still, modernism was not evenly distributed, was not the dominant art every-
where. Modernism reached the status of established art in the various European 
countries and the US at different times. In the United States that was already the 
case in the 1940s. In France with its culture of surrealism in the 1930s the culmi-
nation point of modernism was in the late 1940s. The latecomers where Britain 
and Germany, where only after protracted domestic cultural wars modernism was 
allowed into the cultural pantheon. In Britain, individualist modernism not only 
ran against lasting Victorian traditions of art and style, but also against imperial 
memories. Adopting modernism here was felt by many as losing the empire to the 
US again – and this time forever.
65 Richard H. Pells, Modernist America art, music, movies, and the globalization of American cul-
ture (New Haven [u.a.]: Yale University Press, 2011), 85–98, 85; Andreas Huyssen, After the great 
divide. Modernism, mass culture, postmodernism, Language, discourse, society (Basingstoke 
u.a.: Macmillan, 1988), 197.
66 See Daniela Münkel, “Als ‘deutscher Kennedy’ zum Sieg?” Willy Brandt, die USA und die 
Medien,” Zeithistorische Forschungen 1, no. 2 (2004).
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The arrival of modernism in official Western Germany establishment was sig-
nified by architecture. Chancellor Ludwig Erhard embraced Cold War modernism 
in the construction of the new chancellery in Bonn which embodied the Mies-
van-der-Rohe style.67 Architectural modernism became identified with democ-
racy because of such characteristics as “newness, openness, abstraction, ambi-
guity, and technological innovation.”68
Modernism was a decidedly Western aesthetic style of fine arts, design and 
urban planning after all. The Eastern European governments launched a “dis-
infection campaign” against American culture and influence, focusing on Jazz 
music, Hollywood films and on architecture. “Cosmopolitan” served as a code 
word for America, whereas “democratic” was a synonym for countries under 
communist rule. In 1954 the East German Guide for Architects made clear that 
architecture was divided between the “forces of reaction,” embodied by the CIAM 
(Congrés international d’architecture moderne), and the democratic forces led by 
the Soviet Union: 
As in other capitalist countries, building is predominantly formalist and subordinated to 
the cosmopolitan ideology of American imperialism. This is why buildings look alike what-
ever their location, where they are in West Germany, Italy, France, or America. The housing, 
banks, administration buildings, hotels, and stores in the form of shapeless boxes are an 
expression of the profit hunger of monopoly capitalism under American dominance. The 
obliteration of all national character continues relentlessly. This is evident as well in the 
destruction of valuable historical complexes. Thus architecture is replaced by mere con-
struction.69
The Soviets tried to counter modernism by emphasizing traditional high culture: 
Russian and Soviet history stood for classical culture, whereas American society 
merely offered materialism and popular culture, ran the argument. Only high 
culture embodies common humanistic values, whereas the American cosmo-
politan formalism catered to individualism, the enemy of socialist democracy. 
Indeed, one of the key goals of communist cultural policies was to make high 
67 Burkhard Körner, “Der Kanzlerbungalow von Sep Ruf in Bonn,” Bonner Geschichtsblätter 
49/50 (2001).
68 Jane C. Loeffler, The architecture of diplomacy. Building America’s embassies, rev. 2. ed. (New 
York: Princeton Architectural, 2011), 7, 8.
69 Edwin Collein, Handbuch für Architekten (Berlin: Verl. Technik, 1954). quoted in: Anders 
Åman, Architecture and ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin era: an aspect of Cold War 
history (New York, Cambridge, Mass.: Architectural History Foundation, MIT Press, 1992), 251; 
David Crowley, “Europe Reconstructed, Europe Divided,” in Cold war modern design 1945 – 1970, 
ed. David Crowley and Jane Pavitt (London: V&A Publishing, 2008), 45. 
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culture accessible to the masses. After their defeat of Nazi Germany, the Soviet 
cultural commissars saw themselves as the only remaining standard bearers of 
high culture.70 In East Berlin the cultural commissars distinguished between the 
anti-Semitic and nationalist roots of Nazism and the legacy of Weimar or Vien-
nese classicism, which they promoted from the beginning. Several cultural orga-
nizations, including VOKS, showed the Soviets interest in German high culture.71
“Winning the minds of men” referred particularly to West Germany.72 Refer-
ring to high culture in many cases meant invoking the three “B”s: Bach, Beethoven 
and Brahms, as well as Schiller and Goethe, Kant and Hegel and others. Gaining 
the loyalty of the Western Germans looked promising to the Soviets, since they 
could rely on a long tradition of German anti-Americanism.73 The Soviet approach 
wasn’t completely implausible since high culture served as one of the few sources 
for German identity, supposedly left untainted by the Nazis and by anti-Semitism. 
Adopting a democratic system while clinging to the valued classicism around 
1800 posed a problem in the 1950s since Westernization also involved a contro-
versial Americanization of cultural styles. If the adoption of Western democratic 
values meant a reevaluation of Germany’s cultural past, West Germans remained 
skeptical. They “clearly feared the adoption of democratic values at the expense 
of their cultural heritage.”74 
The American government understood the need to appear as culturally 
attractive to high-brow Europeans. President Truman had already demanded 
of US cultural diplomacy to present a “full and fair picture” of American life to 
Europe and to the Third World.75 Moreover, Eisenhower feared that Europeans 
might see Americans as “a race of materialists. … Spiritual and intellectual values 
are deemed to be almost nonexistent in our country.”76 In a series of exhibitions 
that went on tour, private US institutions promoted domestic design as a charac-
70 See Gienow-Hecht, 403.
71 See Bernd Bonwetsch, Sowjetische Politik in der SBZ, 1945 – 1949 Dokumente zur Tätigkeit 
der Propagandaverwaltung (Informationsverwaltung) der SMAD unter Sergej Tjulʹpanov, Archiv 
für Sozialgeschichte Beiheft (Bonn: Dietz, 1998); Dagmar Buchbinder, “Kunst-Administration nach 
sowjetischem Vorbild: Die Staatliche Kommission für Kunstangelegenheiten,” in Die DDR – 
Analysen eines aufgegebenen Staates, ed. Heiner Timmermann (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001). 
72 Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, 15.
73 See Jessica Gienow-Hecht, “Trumpeting down the walls of Jericho: The politics of art, music 
and emotion in German-American relations, 1870–1920,” Journal of social history 36, no. 3 (2003). 
The New York Philharmonic did not hire a single long-term non-German conductor until 1906.
74 Ibid., 404.
75 Gienow-Hecht and Donfried, 15.
76 Quoted in Barnhisel, “Perspectives USA and the cultural cold war: Modernism in service of 
the state,” 734.
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teristic of the American way of life. “Design was not a marginal aspect of the Cold 
War but central – both materially and theoretically – to the competition over the 
future.”77 Between 1951 and 1955 the MoMA curated several exhibitions such as the 
“American Home 1953” dedicated to displaying design in US households, co-pro-
duced with a number of government agencies, most notably the State Department, 
the Mutual Security Agency and the United States Information Agency (USIA). The 
MoMA thereby assumed an unofficial role in the Foreign Service.78 
Another cultural battleground was France. In 1955 the MoMA sent the exhi-
bition “50 years of American Art” to Paris, later to Zurich, Barcelona, Frankfurt, 
London, The Hague, Vienna and Belgrade. It was designed to counter anxieties 
about American cultural homogenization and imperialism. Indeed, French intel-
lectuals on the left and the right saw American consumerism and mass culture 
as threats to French culture. The exhibition formed part of a “Salute to France,” 
an arts festival organized by the United States Information Service (USIS) to pay 
tribute to French civilization. 79 American art was presented for instance through 
designer chairs by Charles Eames, Henry Bertoia and Eero Saarinen. The exhibit 
“50 years of American art” focused on interior design household appliances and 
living rooms. The MoMA also featured expressionist paintings in a 1956 exhibition 
on “Modern Art in the United States,” which included 12 painters such as Willem 
de Kooning, Franz Kline, Robert Motherwell, Jackson Pollock, and Mark Rothko. 
It could be seen in eight European cities, among them Vienna and Belgrade.80 
77 David Crowley and Jane Pavitt, Cold War modern: design 1945–1970 (London: V&A Pub., 
2008), 14; Elizabeth Armstrong, Birth of the cool: California art, design, and culture at midcentury, 
ed. Michael Boyd, et al., California art, design, and culture at midcentury (Newport Beach, Mu-
nich, New York: Orange County Museum of Art Prestel Art, 2007); Robert H. Haddow, Pavilions 
of plenty. Exhibiting American culture abroad in the 1950s (Washington [u.a.]: Smithsonian Inst. 
Press, 1997). 
78 See Helen M. Franc, “The Early Years of the International Program and Council,” in The Mu-
seum of Modern Art at Midcentury: At Home and Abroad, ed. John Elderfield, vol. 4 of Studies in 
Modern Art (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1995), 112–114. This aspect has been partic-
ularly well researched. Cf. Alessandro Brogi, “A question of balance: How France and the Unit-
ed States created Cold War Europe,” International History Review 30, no. 2 (2008); Giles Scott-
Smith, Networks of empire. The US State Department’s Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, 
France, and Britain 1950 – 70, European Policy (Bruxelles [u.a.]: Lang, 2008); Laura A. Belmonte, 
Selling the American way. U.S. propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia, Pa.: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Martina Topić and Siniša Rodin, Cultural diplomacy and cultural im-
perialism European perspective(s) (Frankfurt am Main [u.a.]: Lang, 2012).
79 See Gay McDonald, “Selling the American Dream: MoMA, Industrial Design and Postwar 
France,” in Journal of Design History 17 (2004), 397–412. 
80 See Gerard Holden, International relations during and after the cold war. A comparative ap-
proach to intellectual history and culture, Sonderveröffentlichung des FKKS (Mannheim: FKKS, 
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The connection between culture and politics was even more obvious in the 
rise of Jazz as musical expression of America’s commitment to ‘freedom.’81 Unlike 
abstract expressionist painting Jazz served as a reminder of the mass cultural 
roots of American Cold War modernism. Jazz critics like John Wilson (New York 
Times) and Marshall Stearns saw Jazz as an original product of American mod-
ernism. They were quick to point out that its roots did not lay in Wall Street, but 
in a segregated South, and that Jazz was an artistic expression of underclass Afri-
can-American culture.
In 1958, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent musicians like Dave 
Brubeck to Poland for 12 concerts, and then to Turkey, to Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
India, Ceylon and finally to Iran and Iraq. Dizzy Gillespie went to Greece, Louis 
Armstrong to Africa. Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, Benny Goodman and 
Miles Davis also participated in this endeavor in Jazz diplomacy. Dave Brubeck’s 
wife wrote an ironic song for Louis Armstrong:
The State Department has discovered jazz 
It reaches folks like nothing ever has. 
When our neighbors called us vermin, 
We sent out Woody Herman. 
That’s what they call cultural exchange.82
Jazz diplomacy was pretty successful by the standards of cultural diplomacy. One 
of the most popular Soviet orchestra leaders Leonid Osipovich Utyosov praised 
US Jazz in 1961 in an article for the Sovietskaya Kultura and countered thereby 
the communist wholesale critique of culture in the US. For him prohibiting Jazz 
as “a forbidden fruit” of capitalism was “dangerous and interfered with the edu-
cation of youth in musical taste.” Jazz was not a “Western imperialist weapon to 
sabotage the morals of young people.” Quite to the contrary: Jazz transcended the 
contamination of the market:
1998); Richard Alan Schwartz, Cold War culture: media and the arts, 1945 – 1990, Cold War Amer-
ica (New York, NY: Facts on File, 1998); Serge Guilbaut, How New York stole the idea of modern 
art. Abstract expressionism, freedom, and the Cold War, Paperback ed. (Chicago [u.a.]: University 
of Chicago Press, 1995); Manfred J. Holler and Barbara Klose-Ullmann, “Abstract expressionism 
as a weapon of the Cold War,” in Culture and External Relations: Europe and Beyond, ed. Jozef 
Bátora and Monika Mokre (Farnham [u.a.]: Ashgate, 2011); Belmonte. 
81 For Cold War and Music cf. Danielle Fosler-Lussier, Music in America’s Cold War diplomacy 
(University of California Press, 2015); Paul Devlin, “Jazz Autobiography and the Cold War,” Pop-
ular Music and Society 38, no. 2 (2015); Shellie M Clark, “Soothing the Savage Beast: Music in the 
Cultural Cold War, 1945–1991,” (2015). 
82 Quoted in The American Interest, Spring 2006.
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We need Jazz. … Good Jazz is art. … I must say that Jazz is not a synonym for imperialism and 
that the saxophone was not born of colonialism. (It had its roots) “not in the bankers’ safes 
but in the poor Negro quarters.”83
Why did abstract art, Jazz, and expressionism, play such an important role as 
exponents of modernism in the cultural Cold War?84 First, private and public 
institutions in the United States tried to prove thereby that the allegation, that 
the US had only low culture, was wrong. In the early 1950s a serious artist was 
a modernist. He shied away from the masses, from mass taste and avoided sim-
plistic realist representations and mistrusted political messages. Instead he 
investigated the psychological complexities of an individual subject. The serious 
modernist artist did just that according to officials in the US cultural diplomacy 
circles. According to Arthur Schlesinger abstract art was proof of individualism 
as well as freedom. Both would find their place in US art, whereas according to 
the Soviet model freedom and individualism had no place in art. Soviet culture 
sought – according to Schlesinger – to undermine the individual, thinking, acting 
subject. Direct political control of the arts “either throttles the serious artist or 
makes him slick and false.”85 The apolitical nature of expressionist art could be 
seen as proof for the freedom of cultural production. “Its very apoliticality made 
‘modernism’ … a key component in an argument about the cultural superiority of 
the West.”86 Finally, modern art, particularly expressionist art, was attractive to 
83 Quoted in Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the 
Cold War (Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press, 2004). Cf. Stephen A Crist, “Jazz as 
Democracy? Dave Brubeck and Cold War Politics,” The Journal of Musicology 26, no. 2 (2009); 
Lisa E. Davenport, Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in the Cold War Era (Jackson, MS, USA: 
University Press of Mississippi, 2009); Keith Hatschek, “The impact of American jazz diplomacy 
in Poland during the cold war era,” 4, no. 3 (2010); Mark Carroll, Music and ideology in Cold War 
Europe (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Von Eschen. On Aaron Copland 
see Emily Abrams Ansari, “Aaron Copland and the Politics of Cultural Diplomacy,” Journal of the 
Society for American Music 5, no. 3 (2011).
84 See Barnhisel, “Perspectives USA and the cultural cold war: Modernism in service of the 
state.”; Mathews Jane de Hart, “Art and Politics in Cold War America,” The American Historical 
Review 81, no. 4 (1976).
85 Barnhisel, Cold War modernists: art, literature, and American cultural diplomacy, 1946–1959; 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, The vital center the politics of freedom (Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 
1949).
86 See Justyna Wierzchowska, The absolute and the cold war: Discourses of Abstract Expresion-
ism (Peter Lang. Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, 2011); Végső; Barnhisel, “Perspec-
tives USA and the cultural cold war: Modernism in service of the state,” 733–34.
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left liberals, since its aesthetic style conveyed at once a modernist utopia and a 
distance from the past.87 
Aesthetic modernism and political modernization
Modernism made claims about art in the age of the Cold War that was largely 
dominated by claims about modernity and modernization. The relation between 
modernism and modernization has therefore been a hotly debated issue in Cold 
War historiography. Were modernism and modernization opposites or could they 
be reconciled. Anticommunist liberalism as well as cultural critics wanted mod-
ernism to be the aesthetic expression of modernization, but modernism was itself 
in many cases a critique of modernization. This resulted more broadly in a mod-
ernist politics of anti-modernization, or even, in Jeffrey Herf’s terms, “reactionary 
modernism.” This ran into considerable resistance. Many anticommunists kept 
pointing to the critical stance of modernism toward modernization. They saw mod-
ernism neither as an ideological expression nor as a valid critique of moderniza-
tion. Art should formulate ethically correct forms of modernization and certainly 
no scathing criticisms of it, ran the argument of anti-modernist modernization. 
Modernism could not easily be reconciled with the politics of modernization. Still 
they had to be related in some way, since “anti-Communist liberalism emerged at 
the meeting point of aesthetic modernism and political modernization.”88 
The Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. tried to bridge the gap between 
modernism and modernity in one of the Cold War liberalism’s most influential 
bestsellers. In 1949 he published The Vital Center, arguing that the Cold War 
antagonism was a “tension inherent in the very logic of modernity.” Modernity 
was an “age of anxiety,” since the industrial modernization failed to produce ade-
quate forms of social organizations. Modernity had not been able to protect the 
individual from anxiety. He saw modern art or modernism as an authentic expres-
sion of that anxiety caused by modern freedom. For Schlesinger modernism was 
no critique of modernization, but rather the fullest expression of freedom whose 
material conditions were produced by modernization.89
Also: Modernization and modernism were no strict opposites, since mod-
ernization went along with its own version of modernism. Albert Wohlstetter, a 
defense intellectual, and Edward Shils, a Chicago sociologist, are good examples. 
87 See Cockroft.
88 Végső, 176.
89 Schlesinger.
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Wohlstetters relationship with the art historian Meyer Schapiro witnessed their 
shared interest in modernism and modernity. This could be called the modernism 
of modernization. According to Nils Gilman it came in at least three flavors: 
a technocosmopolitan flavor, which argued that modernity must be built on the foun-
dations of tradition; a revolutionary flavor, which argued that modernization required a 
radical rupture with tradition; and an authoritarian flavor, which argued that this radical 
rupture could take place only through the force of a centralizing and omniscient state. 
That also worked in the other direction. Modernist art had its own idea about the 
social and the political future. As Nils Gilman pointed out:
Modernism was not just an aesthetic phenomenon but also a form of social and political 
practice in which history, society, economy, culture, and nature itself were all to be the 
object of technical transformation. Modernism was a polysemous code word for all that was 
good and desirable.90 
Modernization theory and modernism shared two characteristics: both were 
essentially elitist and both were resolutely anti-populist. Both even shared a 
sense of authoritarianism. 
Modernization theory stood at the center of the evolving Cold War social sci-
ences. The social sciences as systems of knowledge claimed to understand suc-
cessfully the other side. Western “defense intellectuals” like Frederick Osborn 
used social scientific approaches to analyze Communism, make capitalism com-
patible with the welfare state and to portray Modernism as the aesthetic conse-
quence of that approach.91 The social sciences seemed to hold “the key to under-
stand the mysterious world behind the iron curtain.”92 Just as physics had shaped 
World War II, social science could shape the postwar period.93
90 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the future. Modernization theory in Cold War America, New studies 
in American intellectual and cultural history (Baltimore [u.a.]: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2003), 7–9.
91 Wierzchowska; Pamela M. Lee, “Aesthetic Strategist: Albert Wohlstetter, the Cold War, and a 
Theory of Mid-Century Modernism,” October, no. 138 (2011).
92 Lynne Viola, “The Cold War within the Cold War,” Kritika-Explorations in Russian and 
Eurasian History 12, no. 3 (2011): 684.
93 David Engerman, “The Rise and Fall of Wartime Social Science: Harvard’s Refugee Interview 
Project, 1950–54,” in Cold war social science, ed. Mark Solovey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012). Cf. Lawrence Freedman, “Social Science and the Cold War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38. 
(2015); Mark Solovey, Shaky foundations the politics-patronage-social science nexus in Cold War 
America (New Brunswick, NJ [u.a.]: Rutgers University Press, 2013).
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Claiming expert knowledge, social scientists advised political actors on 
how to deal with the challenges of a postwar world. Their influence peaked in 
the 1950s and early 1960s. Herman Kahn, director of the RAND Corporation, saw 
himself as a new Clausewitz in the era of nuclear war. As leading defense intellec-
tual he published a treatise under the title “On Thermonuclear War” in 1959.94 Just 
like Daniel Bell, Albert Wohlstetter came from the far left and embodied personally 
the inclusion of social science into respectable Cold War culture. Their compelling 
argument that secured them hegemony in the scientific discourse was modern-
ization. Securing the best way to modernize society was tantamount to winning 
the Cold War. The modernization paradigm became so prominent, that after the 
“Sputnik Shock” of 1957 the perceived incompatibility of political, economic and 
social systems was overshadowed more and more by the shared utopia of techni-
cal and industrial modernization. The Cold War was thereby partly depoliticized 
or better de-systemized. This did not mean, that the war was less dangerous and 
brutal – quite to the contrary. Though the military confrontation moved to proxy 
wars in the Third World, the convergence theory shared by both sides claimed that 
the industrial-technical maximum would be the social and political optimum. Mod-
ernization theory moved both sides from confrontation to competition.
At the turn from the 1950s to the 1960s modernism lost its grip on Cold War 
culture. New forms arrived that were more prone to popular and mass culture. A 
new “erotics of the art” (Susan Sontag) replaced the formalism and high serious-
ness of modernism. The youth culture put other cultural dichotomies center stage 
than that of modernism versus realism. Why did the Cold War modernist project 
end in the US with the Eisenhower era and beyond the US around 1960? 
First, the occupation with Europe’s moderate left and its loyalty faded away. 
Modernism and consensus capitalism had succeeded as role models. The threat 
of a communist takeover of Western Europe was gone after the Hungarian uprising 
in 1956 and its appalling impact on Western leftist intellectuals. Modernism had 
been successful and was part of the establishment. A new generation trying to find 
new answers did not see modernism on the side of the solution but rather on the 
side of the problem. Modernism seemed to convey a sense of order, coherence and 
control and to evade the immediate experience that art was supposed to capture.95
94 See Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960). 
On Kahn see Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, The worlds of Herman Kahn. The intuitive science of thermo-
nuclear war (Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]: Harvard University Press, 2005); Janet Farrell Brodie, “Learn-
ing Secrecy in the Early Cold War: The RAND Corporation,” Diplomatic History 35, no. 4 (2011). 
95 Barnhisel, Cold War modernists: art, literature, and American cultural diplomacy, 1946–1959; 
Lynn Keller, Re-making it new contemporary American poetry and the modernist tradition, Cambridge 
studies in American literature and culture (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
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Secondly unidirectional informational programs gave way to cultural 
exchange programs. Modernisms high seriousness and aloofness was under-
stood as part of that essentially educational and non-communicative culture, 
the youth culture as well as the students wanted to distance themselves from. 
Already the Eisenhower administration, but then particularly the Kennedy 
administration intensified and broadened these exchange programs. Finally 
culture itself changed. Cold War modernism had been essentially a print phe-
nomenon. The audience had engaged with modernism in forms of print: posters, 
magazines, manifestoes, small-press books, broadsides, advertisements, gallery 
flyers, catalogs and programs for musical and theater performances. Even mod-
ernist painting was essentially two-dimensional. “Much of modernism in the 
visual and literary arts concerned itself with the problems of capturing dynamic 
motion in a static medium.”96 By the 1960s visual culture gained importance and 
with it TV. Movies had been central to culture all along, but the television brought 
a new quality to visual culture and to where people could get their information 
and their world views from. TV ownership in the US went up from 9 % in 1950 to 
almost 90 % in 1960. Already contemporaries saw that the rise of visual culture 
would not only alter the audiences but also the notion of culture itself. George F. 
Kennan voiced these concerns in West Berlin in 1961: Mass culture with a central-
ized influence of the new visual media could lead to a society under complete 
control, where nobody had any desire for more sophisticated forms of culture. An 
age illuminated by TV screens would in fact be a dark age, he told the audience.97 
The rise of visual Cold War culture had a lasting impact on the notion of 
culture as well as on the Cold War. It changed the dynamics between culture and 
the Cold War that had been established in a print culture. Until the advent of 
the electronic age visual culture didn’t change the communication at work in 
Cold War culture. What had formerly been distributed uni-directionally by print 
was now distributed by visual media. The Cold War on TV did not allow for any 
form of comment. Visuality allowed for more immediate emotional contact. This 
contact bridged social, cultural, as well as linguistic divides. Images, TV, and 
movies played a crucial role in the imaginative and affective construction of the 
Cold War, a conflict, that in the US and Western Europe at least, lacked material 
reality.
What visual culture did change in the cultural Cold War was the personal 
and emotional immersion of the audience as well as the range and accessibility 
96 Barnhisel, Cold War modernists: art, literature, and American cultural diplomacy, 1946–1959, 
257.
97 Ibid., 258.
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of information. That did not only hold true for warfare as with the often cited 
Vietnam war, which was the first war on TV. It included new formats and genres 
that displaced the Cold War in Western or later in science fiction and began to 
exhibit new characters and plots. 
Visualizing the Cold War enemy took on many forms. Mapping the blocks 
was common throughout the 1950s. It was probably the most common visual 
feature of the Cold War. Cold War maps offered a visual construction of the Soviet 
Union.98 The 1951 version of the National Geographic Society’s “World Map” had 
the US at the center. It used the Van der Grinten projection that made neighboring 
countries Canada and the USSR larger than they were. The projection was used 
between 1922 and 1988. The US was surrounded by a USSR in Eurasia and a USSR 
in Siberia, a dominant presence that called quite visually for resistance if not con-
tainment. The map presented a political message packaged as a self-evident map. 
As the editors explain, the US is in the center, “since it is the source of so much of 
the leadership and aid, so many of the men, machines, and raw materials needed 
for the preservation of freedom in older lands.” The connection between space, 
nationhood and citizenship spelled out a clear Cold War message. The National 
Geographic Society’s maps – just as this World map – were the basis for maps 
used by newspapers and TV. As the centerpiece of public cartography it visual-
ized the Cold War for generations. 99
3 Cold War culture as recoding
Culture means more than the extension of politics. The representational link 
between culture and politics can be replaced by a relational link.100 Wars and 
conflicts do not only use culture for non-cultural ends. Culture is rather a way 
to produce meaning of wars and conflicts itself. Conflicts themselves are cultur-
ally constructed, framed and reframed. What are commonly referred to as the 
“Eastern and the Western blocs” did not just employ cultural means to political 
ends; they were themselves profoundly shaped by the repertoire of cultural forms 
which governed the antagonism of the Cold War. Methodologically it is therefore 
useful to go beyond a conception of representation and to focus on culture as 
98 Timothy Barney, Mapping the Cold War: cartography and the framing of America’s internation-
al power (University of North Carolina Press, 2015).
99 Ibid., 99; Jeremy Black, Maps and Politics (London, GBR: Reaktion Books, 2000), 31.
100 See Stuart Hall, “The work of Representation,” in Representation: Cultural Representations 
and Signifying Practices, ed. Stuart Hall (London: SAGE Publications, 1997), 15–64.
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re-imagination and re-coding. Cold War culture not only narrated or visualized 
political threats and the Cold War antagonism, but it eventually became a plat-
form for criticism and re-imagination of the Cold War itself. 
Modernism and modernity had modified the Cold War binary code of “West 
versus East” or “US versus USSR” into “modern versus traditional” or “progress 
versus tradition/reactionary.” Again – as with the political binary codes – both 
sides could use them and link modernity to their own system. That reframed the 
Cold War dichotomy and allowed for partial consensus and coexistence. Deadly 
conflict was reframed as competition.
Giving new meaning to Cold War culture therefore meant not only oppos-
ing the political dichotomy “US – USSR” but also the dichotomy “modern – 
traditional.” Historically this reframing can be traced in cultural texts, images, 
movies and artefacts, that distance themselves from politics and modernism and 
reframe the Cold War. From a moral or religious standpoint one could argue for 
the inherent immorality of the Cold War. From a more disillusioned or even nihil-
ist background, pursuing a Cold War seemed anyway useless and self-gratula-
tory. As literary styles irony, parody and satire were at hand for plotting the Cold 
War. Spy novels and science fiction read the Cold War culture psychologically 
through anxieties101 and literary introspections into the twisted self and looked 
at its antagonisms and schisms.102 
Re-coding I: The spy novel
The Cold War’s international and global threats were reenacted and recoded in lit-
erature.103 The most prominent literary topics dealing with the Cold War critically 
101 Eva Horn, Der geheime Krieg. Verrat, Spionage und moderne Fiktion (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer 
Taschenbuch, 2007); Jessica Wang, American science in an age of anxiety. Scientists, anticom-
munism, and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC [u.a.]: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). Cf. 
Daniel Cordle, “Beyond the apocalypse of closure: nuclear anxiety in the postmodern literature 
of the United states,” in Cold war literature: writing the global conflict, ed. Andrew Hammond 
(New York: Routledge, 2006).
102 See Ron Theodore Robin, The making of the Cold War enemy: culture and politics in the 
military-intellectual complex (Princeton, NJ [u.a.]: Princeton University Press, 2001); Tom Engel-
hardt, The end of victory culture. Cold war America and the disillusioning of a generation (New 
York, NY: BasicBooks, 1995).
103 See Marcus M. Payk, “Die Angst der Agenten. Der Kalte Krieg in der westdeutschen TV-Serie 
“John Klings Abenteuer,” in Angst im Kalten Krieg, ed. Bernd Greiner, Christian Th. Müller, and 
Dierk Walter (Hamburg: HIS Verlag, 2009); “Globale Sicherheit und ironische Selbstkontrolle die 
James-Bond-Filme der 1960er Jahre,” Zeithistorische Forschungen 7 (2010); Michael Kackman, 
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were ‘destruction’ and ‘treason’, as laid out in abundant espionage novels.104 A 
particularly well known example of the literary critique of the Cold War is John 
le Carré’s (non de plume for David Cornwell) The Spy who Came in from the Cold, 
first published in 1963 right after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Le Carré’s protagonists in 
Britain and in East Germany are literally of the same kind. The tragic ending of this 
prize winning novel leaves no space for great heroes and bad villains, rather for an 
“ambiguous moralism.”105 The individual is “to seek his skeptical balance between 
ethical and political requirements through flexibility and reason, and learn to live 
with ambiguity.”106 The same can be said of Le Carré’s later spy novels evolving 
around Smiley as the central character. Neither Graham Greene nor Ian McEwan 
followed a representational and moralizing view of the Cold War in their novels.107 
The Cold War spy novel mostly did not reduplicate political narratives. It 
imagined the Cold War in ambiguous forms. That is even true of the James Bond 
saga. Whereas Ian Fleming’s print novels from the 1950s employed a bipolar view 
of West and East, the James Bond movies, starting with Dr. No in 1962, not only 
had a Soviet counterintelligence organization SMERSH (acronym for Russian: 
Специальные Методы Разоблaчения Шпионов = Special Methods of Spy 
Detection), but also an international syndicate of criminals under the acronym 
SPECTRE (acronym for SPecial Executive for Counter-intelligence, Terrorism, 
Revenge and Extortion). The Bond saga transfigured the Cold War into a plot with 
three antagonists: Bond, the Soviet Union and – the longer the more – global 
criminals – often with a Nazi background.108 
Citizen spy: television, espionage, and Cold War culture, Commerce and mass culture series (Min-
neapolis, Minn. [u.a.]: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
104 See Edward P. Comentale, Stephen Watt, and Skip Willman, Ian Fleming & James Bond. The 
cultural politics of 007 (Bloomington, Ind. [u.a.]: Indiana University Press, 2005); James Chapman, 
Licence to thrill. A cultural history of the James Bond films, 2. ed., Cinema and society series (London 
[u.a.]: Tauris, 2007); Andrew Hammond, Cold War literature. Writing the global conflict, Routledge 
studies in twentieth-century literature 3 (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 2005); Adam Piette, The literary 
Cold War: 1945 to Vietnam (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009); Nicholas J Cull, “Reading, 
Viewing and Tuning into the Cold War,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume II: Crises and 
Détente, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
105 Myron J. Aronoff, The spy novels of John Le Carré. Balancing ethics and politics (Basingstoke 
[u.a.]: Macmillan, 1999).
106 R. L. Garthoff, “The spy novels of John LeCarre: Balancing ethics and politics,” Political Science 
Quarterly 115, no. 1 (2000): 150.
107 See Brian Diemert, “The Anti-American: Graham Greene and the Cold War in the 1950s,” 
in Cold War Literature. Writing the Global Conflict, ed. Andrew Hammond (London: Routledge, 
2006), 212–225.
108 Chapman; Comentale, Watt, and Willman.
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Spy novels were popular well beyond Britain. In contrast, espionage as shown 
in Jean Bruce’s popular French OSS 117 novels – sold in more than 24 million 
copies – has to be seen against the background of the Parti Communiste Français 
(PCF). OSS 117 explicitly contested the model of Cold War modernity represented 
by the US. Instead it had a certain French modernity. At its center were elements 
of aristocratic tradition and of hypermodernity.109 
French spy novels were obsessed with delivering a French version of Cold 
War modernity. The popular French spy novels OSS 117 for instance played with 
the figure of an Anglo-American agent, but set center stage a vision of a French 
modernity different from the US model. Hubert Bonnisseur de la Bath not only 
handled his technical equipment with ease but was also of noble descent, thereby 
clearly distinguished from his American rivals.110 But with de Gaulle’s comeback 
in 1958, France’s cultural dependence on Anglo-Saxon models ended due to a 
desire to reassert France’s position in the world. French Cold War modernity had 
a quite positive relationship to tradition. It valued social cohesion more than the 
market model. The French spy novel represented a third way between the bloc 
modernities of the East and West.
Re-coding II: Science fiction dystopias
Dystopias of all kinds were on the rise in the 1960s, containing displaced imagi-
nations of Cold War fears, anxieties, paranoia and hopes. “One of the most strik-
ing aspects of literature written during the Cold War is the prevalence of dysto-
pian and/or anti-utopian works.”111 They referred to politics in at least two ways. 
Dystopias satirized both society as it existed and the utopian aspiration to trans-
form it.112 According to Keith Booker, dystopian societies in science fiction novels 
109 Paul Bleton, La cristallisation de l’ombre. Les origines oubliées du roman d’espionage sous la 
IIIe République, Médiatextes (Limoges: Pulim, 2011); “Metamorphosis of the popular novel,” 
Quinzaine Litteraire, no. 974 (2008).
110 Les anges de Machiavel. Essai sur le roman d’espionnage: froide fin et funestes moyens, les 
espions de papier dans la paralittérature française, du Rideau de fer à la chute du Mur, Collection 
“Etudes paralittéraires” (Québec: Nuit Blanche, 1994); Western, France: la place de l’Ouest dans 
l’imaginaire français (Paris: Belles Lettres [u.a.], 2002); “Reheating the planet for spies in from the 
cold?,” Quinzaine Litteraire, no. 974 (2008); “Metamorphosis of the popular novel.”
111 Derek Maus, “Series and systems: Russian and American dystopian satires of the Cold War,” 
Critical Survey 17, no. 1 (2005): 72.
112 Chris Ferns, Narrating utopia. Ideology, gender, form in utopian literature, Liverpool science 
fiction texts and studies (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999).
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were “generally more or less thinly veiled re-figurations of a situation that already 
exists in reality.”113 Their themes infection, invasion by stealth, and subversion 
were all related to Cold War anxieties and paranoia. They grew stronger after 
America’s Vietnam debacle. Economically, science fiction became the dominant 
genre at the box office replacing the Western. The genre played on the fear that 
America’s capacity would not suffice to resist invasion by communist enemies 
and that the country would not be able to maintain its way of life in a post-apoca-
lyptic world. Lesser-known authors like Frederick Pohl, Poul Anderson and Philip 
Wylie contributed to this genre of Cold War science fiction as much as the bet-
ter-known Isaac Asimov, Ursula K. LeGuin, Ray Bradbury and Harlan Ellison. 
In an influential essay in 1965, Susan Sontag pointed to certain aesthetic 
characteristics of Cold War science fiction: 
Science fiction films are not about science. They are about disaster, which is one of the 
oldest subjects of art. 
She went on: 
The science fiction film … is concerned with the aesthetics of destruction, with the pecu-
liar beauties to be found in wreaking havoc, making a mess. And it is in the imagery of 
destruction that the core of a good science fiction film lies.114 
Cold War science fiction exploited an aesthetic attraction of destruction, which 
refers not to the death of the individual but to “collective incineration and extinc-
tion.” The aesthetic of mass destruction points not to scientific, or even political 
utopias, but to inadequate responses to disaster, war, the Holocaust and nuclear 
annihilation. Susan Sontag relates the Cold War aesthetics to a more general 
20th century experience of catastrophes. Science-fiction novels and films reveal 
human limitations in responding to “the most profound dilemmas of the con-
temporary situation.” The need to cope with these extreme experiences leads to a 
desire to neutralize and even beautify terror and anxiety.115 
Science fiction novels and films interrogated key metaphors, the perception 
of the Cold War in the US, but also in the USSR was structured around. Such 
metaphors were “dangerous predator,” “paranoia,” “infiltration,” “arms race,” 
113 Marvin Keith Booker, The dystopian impulse in modern literature: fiction as social criticism, 
1. publ. ed., Contributions to the study of science fiction and fantasy (Westport, Conn. u. a.: 
Greenwood Press, 1994), 15.
114 Susan Sontag, “The imagination of disaster,” Commentary 40, no. 4 (1965): 44.
115 Ibid., 48.
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“iron curtain” and others. Bernard Wolfe’s Limbo (1952) recoded “arms race” as a 
race between prosthetics or artificial limbs, undermining confidence in scientific 
progress, since those prosthetic limbs keep rebounding on their wearers.116 Nick 
Boddie transforms the “Iron Curtain” metaphor into an “atomic curtain” in his 
1956 novel which describes post-Holocaust America, not the Soviet Bloc.117 In the 
same way the 1954 film Them! uses the metaphor of ants-as-monsters and ants-
as-people to depict the Soviet society.118
American as well as Soviet literary dystopias went against the simple bipolar 
utopian sentiment. Their authors didn’t support either side in its ideological strug-
gle. They rather wanted to invalidate the conflicts overarching logical context. 
Gary Saul Morson distinguishes ‘serial dystopias’ from ‘systemic dystopias’. “In 
the former a society is caught in the loop of equally undesirable revolutions and 
restorations; in the latter all parties in a given ideological struggle are presented 
as dystopian, thereby undermining any claim of moral superiority therein.”119 
Both kinds of dystopias were applied to the Cold War.
Science fiction in the East increasingly diverged from official prescriptions and 
engaged in a critique of the regime and – as systemic dystopia – in questioning the 
Cold War itself and its assumption about a better future. The most important writers 
were the Strugatsky brothers in the Soviet Union and Stanislav Lem in Poland. Sci-
ence-fiction found its “main readership in a key group of the communist society: 
young, urban male members of the technical intelligentsia and skilled workers, fos-
tered by the system, but with a keen sense of belonging to a global scientific com-
munity.”120 Science fiction therefore was a social vision of the future with a potential 
to uproot its audience from the national and ideological settings they came from. 
For Soviet writers the dystopian character of the Soviet Union, as an inverted, not 
simply a failed utopia, had been made evident by nearly three decades of Stalinism. 
As a consequence, scientocracy – as narrated in science fiction novels – became a 
coded critique of contemporary party bureaucracy. Others like Stanislav Lem went 
even further. He used his science fiction novels to contribute to a general cognitive 
theory of knowledge beyond Cold War cognitive models (Solaris, 1961). Vladimir 
Voinovich introduced a critique of the linguistic control by the communist party 
116 David Seed, “Deconstructing the Body Politic in Bernard Wolfe’s ‘Limbo’,” Science Fiction 
Studies (1997).
117 American science fiction and the Cold War: literature and film, 2.
118 Ibid.
119 Maus, 73.
120 Patrick Major, “Future Perfect? Communist Science Fiction in the Cold War,” Cold War 
History 4, no. 1 (2003): 73, 74.
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into his novel Moscow 2042 (1986). The toilet mutates to “natfunctbur,” short for 
“Bureau of natural functions.”121
On the US side the same held true for the science fiction critique of the “Amer-
ican dream.” Particularly the 1960s and early 70s saw a massive disillusionment 
with an overly idealized national self-conception, that “form(ed) the core of 
international relations schemata such as the Cold War schema.”122 The linguistic 
expression of this self-image was the “nukespeak,” mirroring Cold War language 
of the nuclear arms race, 
the language of the nuclear mindset – the world view, or system of beliefs – of nuclear 
developers. ... (This) mindset acts like a filter sorting information and perceptions, allow-
ing it to be processed and some to be ignored, consciously or unconsciously. Nukespeak 
encodes the beliefs and assumptions of the nuclear mindset; the language and the mindsets 
continuously reinforce each other.123
Nukespeak was in the beginning a social vision of a better future with “euphoric 
visions of nuclear technologies” such as X-rays or radium. That changed when the 
war in Vietnam and the practices of the Nixon administration motivated young 
writers to use Science fiction for other purposes than to celebrate American progress.
Re-coding III: Postmodernism
Already Cold War dystopias like Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 (1961) deflated such ide-
alistic self-images. The irrationality of 1960s America was mirrored in multiple 
unpredictable reactions to almost every action in Catch-22 that render the cause-
and-effect logic largely meaningless.124 Displacing the Cold War of the early 1960s 
in a World war II setting, he reversed the values and assumptions of warfare: heroes 
desert, the rules of military conduct are corrupt, the purpose of war is irrational, 
the game is fixed. In 1961, Joseph Heller was one of the first writers to identify the 
irrationality of the Cold War based on the insane logic of militarism in the nuclear 
age.125 In Heller’s Catch 22 “the enemy is anybody who’s going to get you killed, no 
121 Maus, 78.
122 Matthew S. Hirshberg, Perpetuating patriotic perceptions. The cognitive function of the Cold 
War (Westport, Conn. [u.a.]: Praeger, 1993), 17.
123 Stephen Hilgartner, Richard C. Bell, and Rory O’Connor, Nukespeak. Nuclear language, 
visions, and mindset (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1982).
124 Maus, 81.
125 Peter J. Kuznick, Rethinking cold war culture (Washington, DC [u.a.]: Smithsonian Institution 
Press, 2001).
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matter which side he is on. … It doesn’t make a damned bit of difference who wins 
the war to someone who’s dead.” Two years later Heller’s example was followed by 
John Le Carrés The Spy who Came in from the Cold. 12 years later Thomas Pynchon’s 
Gravity’s Rainbow (1973) is also set shortly before and after the end of World War 
II, mirroring 1970s anxieties about war and total destruction. It takes Heller’s point 
about the irrationality of war even further into philosophical nominalism and asks, 
“whether meaningful events are directed by a supremely competent mailman – a 
symbolic order or a ‘Them’ – or whether they are merely made meaningful by a dis-
course.” The context of the Cold War was immediately at hand, when he “provides 
a cogent tableau of the myths of individual action and of collective action, both 
visibly dissolving in the face of public events.” Taken together Pynchon recoded 
Cold War conspiracies as a discourse creating its own reality.126 This resonated with 
the broader public since the Cold War was the high noon of conspiracies, real and 
imagined. The quest to “know your enemy” (David Engerman) knew hardly any 
limitation.127 The enemy was to be found in places, where one would not expect 
him: he was the “enemy from within.” The McCarthy era gave an example of how 
that worked politically. The Cold War figuration was displaced historically, spa-
tially, socially and in other ways. Its aesthetic displacement allowed for new modes 
of imagination, conflating dominant political and subversive ideological positions. 
Popular culture imagining the Cold War relocated the political conflict into rituals 
of everyday life, most notably modern mass entertainment, serving ideological pur-
poses.
Literature addressed Cold War anxieties collectively as well as individually, 
rendering accounts not only of the red menace but also of the “yellow peril,” the 
US image of Communist East Asia. Richard Condon’s novel The Manchurian Can-
didate of 1959 manifests the “Cold War orientalism” feeding into older stereotypes 
of Chinese immigration.128 Fears of communist brainwashing fed suspicion, para-
noia and anxiety typical of the Cold War era.129 Cold War literature positioned 
itself against the backdrop of “containment culture” (Alan Nadel). The contain-
ment policies of the 1950s made the personal political.130 It made the political 
126 Timothy Melley, Empire of conspiracy the culture of paranoia in postwar America (Ithaca, NY 
[u.a.]: Cornell University Press, 2000).
127 Tiago Mata, “The enemy within. Academic freedom in 1960s and 1970s American social 
sciences,” in The unsocial social science? (Durham, NC [u.a.]: Duke University Press, 2010). 
128 Christina Klein, Cold War orientalism. Asia in the middlebrow imagination, 1945–1961 
(Berkeley, Calif. [u.a.]: University of California Press, 2003).
129 Hammond.
130 Robin; Alan Nadel, Containment culture: American narrative, postmodernism, and the atomic 
age (Durham, NC [u.a.]: Duke University Press, 1995).
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Cold War narrative relevant in every aspect of life. Containment became domestic 
containment. “More than merely a metaphor for the Cold War on the home front, 
containment aptly describe[d] the way in which public policy, personal behavior, 
and even political values where focused on the home.”131 The historian Elaine 
Tyler May analyzed the Kelly Longitudinal Study with its interviews of 600 middle 
class men and women, forming their families in the 1950s, and pointed out, that 
“domestic containment” and Kennan-inspired political containment of commu-
nism were two sides of the same coin. The “homeward bound” Cold War culture 
saw women creating a secure “psychological fortress” in the apolitical, affluent, 
middle class suburban home containing all sorts of dangerous social forces like 
“women’s sexuality, homosexuality, labor unions, and civil rights activism.” They 
were all seen as disrupting American domestic security.132
Postmodernism tried to replace the binary language of “containment culture” 
(Alan Nadel) in its modernist disguise by “polysystemic mappings.” Some critics 
interpreted the rise of American postmodernism as “a theoretical and artis-
tic movement that called into question the containment paradigm itself.” They 
claimed that by “challenging the dichotomous imagination of the Cold War, post-
modernism proposed polysystemic cartographies that mediated among differenti-
ated subjects and cultures according to the extravagant geography of ‘zigging and 
zagging (sides), going ahead and doubling back, making loops inside loops.’”133
John Barth, Donald Barthelme, Richard Brautigan, Robert Coover, Ursula K. 
LeGuin, Thomas Pynchon, Ishmael Reed and Kurt Vonnegut used the satirical 
mode in their critique of the binary coding of Cold War culture.134 Their “critific-
tional discourse” not only went against all ideological dichotomies, but also 
against the established form of the novel. It attacked outright “the vehicle that 
expressed and represented that reality: discursive language and the traditional 
131 Elaine Tyler May, Homeward bound. American families in the Cold War era, Fully rev. and up-
dated 20th anniversary ed ed. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2008).
132 Barnhisel and Turner; May.
133 Marcel Cornis-Pope, “Postmodernism’s Polytropic Imagination. Unwriting/rewriting the Cold 
War Narratives of Polarization,” in Narrative Innovation and cultural rewriting in the Cold War 
and after, ed. Marcel Cornis-Pope (London: Palgrave, 2001), 3; Thomas Pynchon, Mason & Dixon 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1997), 586.
134 After 1968 more writers emerged: Walter Abish, Raymond Federman, Kenneth Gangemi, 
Madeline Gins, Steve Katz, Clarence Major, Gilbert Sorrentino, and Ronald Sukeruck. They reject-
ed all “mimetic realism and mimetic pretension” and went against the “silent agreement with the 
official discourse of the state” altogether. Raymond Federman, Critifiction: postmodern essays, 
SUNY series in postmodern culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
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form of the novel.”135 The critique of contents went hand in hand with a critique 
of form. The innovation of narrative strategies was not confined to the West or to 
the United States. Eastern writers also employed the postmodern narrative strat-
egy to attack the foundations of the Communist hyperreality, while writing from 
the margins of society.136 It is here that Hayden White’s argument on the “content 
of form” applies most beyond historiography, since the formalism and transfig-
uration of the form of the novel went hand in hand with a critique of Cold War 
dichotomies in the West as well as of communism’s ever more futile insistence on 
its hyperrealism. This formalism had content that undermined the credibility of 
the Cold War.137
“During the Cold War Utopia came to designate the program (…) which 
betrayed a will to uniformity and the ideal purity of a perfect system, that has 
to be imposed by force on its imperfect and reluctant subjects.”138 Instead irony 
was “the quintessential expression of late modernism and of the ideology of the 
modern as that was developed during the Cold War (whose traces and impasses 
it bears like a stigmata).”139 Late Postmodernists like Frederic Jameson disrupted 
the bipolar thinking that had characterized Cold War culture. The impact of this 
development was obvious even within the narrative strategies. Postmodernism 
and de-storification took over from literary modernism.140 Andrew Hammond 
points to four literary strategies in Cold War literature: narrative instability, onto-
logical uncertainty, scathing self-reflexivity and suspicion of all forms of meta-
narrative and historiography.141 
There is another ring to the notion of uncertainty, that lay at the center of 
Cold War culture. Cold War actors were obsessed with uncertainty and chance 
from the early days of the nuclear age on. Uncertainty and chance could have 
disastrous consequences taking decision-making away from politics. This again 
collided with the scientific world view of communism, but also of Western mod-
ernization theory. “Stalinist objectivity” saw no room for chance in history. All 
135 Ibid., 23, 32.
136 Cornis-Pope, 4.
137 Hayden White, The content of the form narrative discourse and historical representation (Bal-
timore, Md [u.a.]: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
138 Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the future. The desire called utopia and other science fic-
tions (London [u.a.]: Verso, 2005).
139 Ibid., 179.
140 Marcel Cornis-Pope, “National literatures and diasporas: towards a polycentric concept of 
culture,” World Literature Studies 2, no. 1 (2010); M. Cornis-Pope, “Reading cultures: The con-
struction of readers in the twentieth century,” College Literature 26, no. 2 (1999).
141 Hammond.
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political and economic changes occurred according to historical destiny. Jerzy 
Kosinski, a US writer of Polish descent and winner of the National Book Award, 
engaged with the motto “There is no chance, comrade!” in “The future is ours, 
comrade!” (1960). He associated ‘chance’ with American freedom and the denial 
of chance with Soviet totalitarianism, resonating the ideology of the Ford Foun-
dation and the US establishment. The concept of chance circulated in Cold War 
literary culture, not only in the cultural Cold Wars of the 1950s.
Think tanks like the RAND Corporation tried to tame uncertainty by using 
game theory. Based on game theory and refined mathematical models Hermann 
Kahn came to the conclusion that 2 million dead in the US meant two years of eco-
nomic recovery whereas 160 million dead resulted in a 10-year recovery period. 
The Cold War obsession with chance started on the front pages of the New York 
Times, game theory was first discussed in the comics section of The New Repub-
lic.142 The shift from modernism to late modernism around 1960 goes along with 
a shift in looking at chance and uncertainty: where game theory could provide 
some certainty and validity in dealing with uncertainty, authors like Thomas 
Pynchon and Vladimir Nabokov use chance as tracers for the fault lines of Cold 
War culture. Thomas Pynchons V. (1963) and Vladimir Nabokov Pale fire (1962) 
gave it another twist, foregrounding the critique controlling cultural formations 
in the US. Pynchon and Nabokov dealt with chance and design, Pynchon in a cri-
tique of what he saw as the “tyranny of capitalist aesthetics,” Nabokov exposing 
the homophobic narrative of postwar US culture.143
Both authors can be seen paradigmatically as examples for the rise of self-re-
flexivity in Cold War literature. Both turned on the literary conventions of the 
high modernism. Robert Genter has labeled this “late modernism.” Marcel Cor-
nis-Pope prefers to label it “early postmodernism.”144 These scholars observe a 
kind of cultural sea change in the early 1960s from high modernism to late mod-
ernism: in painting from Jackson Pollock to Andy Warhol, in literature from Jack 
Kerouac to Thomas Pynchon, and in literary criticism from Allen Tate to Paul de 
Man. The latter ones all shied away from what was evident to the former authors 
or painters. Robert Genter defines late modernism as follows: 
142 Steven Belletto, No accident, comrade chance and design in Cold War American narratives 
(Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford University Press, 2012).
143 Joseph Kosinski and Irving R. Levine, The future is ours comrade conversations with the rus-
sians (London: The Bodley Head, 1960); Belletto; Thomas Pynchon, V. a novel, 4. impr ed. (Phil-
adelphia u.a.: Lippincott, 1963); Vladimir Vladimirovich Nabokov, Pale fire a novel, 1. impr ed. 
(New York: Putnam, 1962).
144 Marcel Cornis-Pope, Narrative innovation and cultural rewriting in the Cold War and after (New 
York, NY [u.a]: Palgrave, 2001).
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Unwilling to abandon the literary and cultural revolution begun in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries by their modernist predecessors, whose original goal was to explore 
new forms of consciousness and unearth new forms of perception in the hopes of transform-
ing the world at large, late modernists argued not only that the nature of the aesthetic form 
needed to be rethought in an age of mass media but that the general assumptions about the 
nature of subjectivity needed to be updated. They reformulated aesthetics as a mode of sym-
bolic action – a deliberate attempt to use the aesthetic form to challenge the choice of lens 
through which individuals made sense of the world around them and to persuade them that 
the visions offered by the artist were not merely more poetic but possibly more liberating.145
At the center of this shift away from modernist to “late modernist” Cold War 
culture stood self-reflexivity, which was expressed through new literary tech-
niques, the cracking open of traditional plot structures, exposing open ends 
and in general a higher awareness of the process of literary production and of 
the author. Thomas Pynchon stood for the “scathing self-reflexivity,” that went 
along with the search for the nature of subjectivity. He, John Barth, John Hawkes 
and others wrote about the end of the subject with depthless and empty char-
acters rejecting the heroism of high modernity. In cultural analysis authors like 
Jacques Derrida, Paul de Man and Roland Barthes went against the notions of the 
author and the text as the grounds for meaning. Its Cold War context was shining 
through in what they distanced themselves from: the high modernist belief in the 
autonomy of the arts as proof for a free society.146
Re-coding IV: Movies
Recoding the Cold War in popular movies was largely achieved through aesthetic 
displacements. While some movies directly reenacted the conflict between ‘cap-
italists’ and ‘communists’ on the screen, others displaced the conflict to other 
settings.147 The cinematic displacement into a family setting was particularly 
thrilling. It evolved around the generational conflict of the “nuclear family” 
that emerged out of the civil rights movement.148 As a result Cold War visual 
145 Robert Genter, Late modernism: Art, culture, and politics in Cold War America, The arts and 
intellectual life in modern America (Philadelphia, Pa. [u.a.]: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2010), 4.
146 Ibid., 316.
147 Tony Shaw and Denise J. Youngblood, Cinematic Cold War: the American and Soviet struggle 
for hearts and minds (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010).
148 Frank Costigliola, “The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western 
Alliance,” Diplomatic History 21, no. 2 (1997).
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culture transformed the conflict between “them versus us” into “we versus us,” 
opening up internal differences regarding class, gender, and race. Movies could 
and did internalize the Cold War from a political conflict into a psychological 
drama.
Displacement of the Cold War in film often took on the form of Western and 
cowboy movies. The height of the early Cold War was the peak of Western movies. 
“The Western was the genre of the period after World War II.” In the 1930s their 
strong moral message had reassured a depression ridden American audience. 
After 1945 Western movies portrayed US resistance against USSR aggression in 
historical disguise. John Ford’s Cavalry Trilogy (Fort Apache 1948; She Wore a 
Yellow Ribbon 1949; Rio Grande 1950) was especially famous for visualizing the 
fear of external enemies, celebrating traditional American values and glorifying 
the military. Films like The Searchers (John Ford 1956), Shane (George Stevens, 
1953), The Alamo (John Wayne, 1960 version), and particularly The Man Who Shot 
Liberty Valance (John Ford 1962) connected frontier morality with the Cold War.149 
The frontier Western heralded the individual citizen, that could stand above the 
law when defending his family, city or – by extension – his country. They emphat-
ically dramatized freedom by showing “a hero who must disobey commands in 
order to save the command structure.”150 The moral impulse of John Ford’s film 
was clear: the hero had to act alone to preserve the social order. The Hollywood 
Western provided a mythic landscape and a compelling narrative of American 
power during the Cold War. It reinscribed “the time-honored myth of heroic fron-
tier individualism into the demands of uniting to defeat a common enemy, and 
thereby both proving and effectuating the nation’s moral right to victory.”151
The Western lost its prominent position in Cold War culture in the 1960s 
and was replaced by SciFi movies of the “Star Trek” and “Star Wars” type. The 
movie organizing metaphor of life on the frontier with all its enemies was kept 
and displaced into space. Producer Gene Roddenberry referred to Star Trek as 
a “wagon trek to the stars” and to its actors as “pioneers of the space age.” The 
opening line of the first series ran “Space, the final frontier.”152 As Steven Belletto 
149 Corkin; Richard Aquila, The sagebrush trail: western movies and twentieth-century America, 
The modern American West (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2015).
150 Peter Baker, “Directions in left theory – cinema in the wake of the cold war,” Minnesota 
Review, no. 41–42 (1994).
151 Arthur F. Redding, Turncoats, traitors, and fellow travelers: culture and politics of the early 
Cold War, 1. print. ed. (Jackson, Miss.: University Press of Mississippi, 2008), 134.
152 Susanne M. Maier, “Star Trek und das unentdeckte Land am Rande des Universums. Ein 
amerikanischer Mythos,” in Sinnwelt Film. Beiträge zur interdisziplinären Filmanalyse, ed. Wil-
helm Hofmann (Baden-Baden: 1996). 
Brought to you by | Université de Fribourg
Authenticated | siegfried.weichlein@unifr.ch author's copy
Download Date | 2/8/17 10:14 AM
60   Siegfried Weichlein
put it: “The Western goes galactic.” The first Star Wars (IV) film came out in 1977. 
It transferred tropes and conventions of Western movies to another galaxy and 
tried to re-contextualize the US Cold War ethos. After Vietnam and – to a lesser 
degree – Watergate the object-specific meaning of “East versus West” had lost its 
meaning. The small planet earth was put in a multi-galactic perspective. Whereas 
the Western was a historical and legitimating myth, the Star Wars films presented 
the possibility of heroism, love, and success only, when all earthly social, histor-
ical and even natural realities are set aside.153 
Another displacement in Cold War films were historical epics, most promi-
nently in the 1950s, reenacting the Cold War antagonism of freedom versus dic-
tatorship in biblical times and moralizing it at the same time. These moralizing 
historical displacements were a common feature of Cold War cinema. Historical 
epics as Cecil B. DeMille’s Ten Commandments (1956), Stanley Kubrick’s Spart-
acus (1960) or Anthony Mann’s The Fall of the Roman Empire (1964) served as 
historical illustrations of a contemporary conflict. The Jewish emancipation from 
the tyrannical Pharaoh bore a direct resemblance to the US fight against Soviet 
atheism. The extremely conservative director Cecil B. DeMille, whose taste for 
biblical drama and proportions earned him the nickname “Apostle to Million-
aires,” articulated the film’s message: 
The theme of this picture is whether men ought to be ruled by God’s law or whether they 
are to be ruled by the whims of a dictator like Ramses. Are men the property of the state or 
are they free souls under God? This same battle continues throughout the world today. Our 
intention was not to create a story but to be worthy of the divinely inspired story created 
three thousand years ago: the five books of Moses.154
Re-coding V: Internalizing the Cold War
Another mode of displacement was the tendency to internalize the Cold War con-
flict into the society, the individual or gender roles. Political scientist Michael 
Rogin read its polarization as the third demonology of US society after slavery 
and socialism. These challenges were seen as subversions and answered by the 
153 Steven Belletto and Daniel Grausam, American literature and culture in an age of cold war. A 
critical reassessment, New American Canon (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2012), 191; Will 
Wright, “The Empire bites the dust,” Social Text (1982). 
154 Alan Nadel, “God’s Law and the Wide Screen: The Ten Commandments as Cold War ‘Epic’,” 
PMLA 108, no. 3 (1993): 417.
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US establishment with “counter subversions.”155 From the 1950s on invisible 
internal Soviet agents replaced the alien or African-American underclass as the 
target of Cold War counter subversion. It was the invisibility of its influence that 
distinguished the Communist Party from other legitimate opposition groups of 
the past. Rogin sees the most important impact of Cold War movies in the fact that 
it made visible three threatening changes: 
The first development was the rise of the national security state, which counteracted Soviet 
influence by imitating Soviet surveillance. The second … arose from the simultaneous glo-
rification and fear of maternal influence within the family. The third was the emergence of 
a mass society which seemed to homogenize all difference that makes subversives difficult 
to spot.156
Visual culture made two divisions visible that were constitutive for Cold War 
demonology: the distinctions between the free man and the state on the one 
hand and the free state and the slave state on the other. According to Rogin’s 
interpretation of Cold War cinema, the first division was visually imagined by 
the second division: the division between the free man and the state was made 
visible through the division between the free and the slave state. Beyond both 
divisions lay the emotionally even stronger division between motherhood and 
communism, charging the domestic Cold War culture with gender roles.
The internalization of the Cold War threat was particularly evident when it 
came to the motives of the safety of the homeland and the security of the family. 
Most prominent are Alfred Hitchcock’s comments on Cold War culture in The Birds 
(1963). Birds stood here for symbols of nuclear bombs and unprovoked attacks, 
mirroring a deep Cold War fear. Cinematic displacement showed communism as 
a threat to home and hearth, to the family as the psychological fortress, from 
which American citizens could defend their country. A particular threat to the 
family was also at stake in the newly established theme of the alien invasion that 
fed into paranoia. Invasion of the Body Snatchers by Siegel and Kaufman from 
1956 is an example in place. John Frankenheimer’s Manchurian Candidate (1962) 
addresses the motif of the ultimate “enemy from within,” which is brainwashed 
and lives next door.157 The “enemy from within” was represented in this genre 
155 Michael Rogin, “Kiss Me Deadly: Communism, Motherhood, and Cold War Movies,” Repre-
sentations, no. 6 (1984).
156 Gilles Colpart, “America and the Soviet Union – The Cold war of cinema,” Revue du cinema, 
no. 450 (1989): 3.
157 The “Manchurian Candidate” is particularly well researched. Cf. inter alia: S. L. Carruthers, 
“The ‘Manchurian Candidate’ (1962) and the Cold War brainwashing scare,” Historical Journal of 
Film Radio and Television 18, no. 1 (1998); Gongzhao Li, “The Manchurian Candidate and brain-
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as a force within the human psyche. The spreading fear of enemies from within 
catered to what Richard Hofstadter addressed as The paranoid style in American 
politics (1964).158 This paranoia assumed that the enemy was already within the 
country, the family or even the individual psyche. It is this paranoia that led nov-
elist and literary theorist Samuel Delany to suggest in his novel Nevèrÿon (1979) 
that the only hero left in Western civilization must always be a spy.159 Accordingly 
the political witch-hunt of “containment culture” and the search for the enemies 
within aimed ultimately at the collapse of the public and private sphere. 
Re-coding VI: Social sciences
From early on in the Cold War the social sciences engaged in the analysis of its 
actors and its very nature. That wasn’t done for scholarly purposes, but rather to 
serve the political needs of the US administration. The social sciences provided 
important weapons in and paradigms for the understanding of the supposed 
enemy. Rather than being purely academic and scholarly objective, the social 
sciences of the early Cold War recoded the political antagonism in a scholarly 
fashion. Modernization theory provided a language to discern the Western soci-
eties as modern societies and distinguish them from all other societies as well as 
to win over the recently decolonized states in Africa and Asia. What modernism 
was for the arts modernization theory was for the social sciences. This aspect 
has been studied intensively.160 The key point then was, that the social sciences 
and even modernization theory took on a new function, when the social sciences 
stepped out of the role they were supposed to play and recoded the Cold War from 
new perspectives.
washing: From Cold War paranoia to anti-terrorist paranoia,” Foreign Literature Studies 29, no. 4 
(2007); Jean Brugelle, “OSS 117,” Quinzaine Litteraire, no. 974 (2008); Kirshner Jonathan, “Sub-
verting the Cold War in the 1960s: Dr. Strangelove, The Manchurian Candidate, and The Planet 
of the Apes,” Film & History: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Film and Television Studies 31, no. 2 
(2001); Perucci Tony, “The Red Mask of Sanity: Paul Robeson, HUAC, and the Sound of Cold War 
Performance,” TDR: The Drama Review 53, no. 4 (2009).
158 Richard Hofstadter, The paranoid style in American politics and other essays, [1st ed. (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1965).
159 John Nelson, The American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001): 250; Melley.
160 Michael E. Latham, Modernization as ideology. American social science and “nation build-
ing” in the Kennedy era, New Cold War history (Chapel Hill, NC [u.a.]: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2000); Sebastian Conrad, “‘The Colonial Ties are Liquidated’: Modernization Theory, Post-
War Japan and the Global Cold War,” Past & Present, no. 216 (2012).
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Cold War Sovietology had the function to help “know your enemy.” Dressed 
up in academic language and university institutions it was serving both “Mars and 
Minerva.” It became a national endeavor to analyze almost every aspect of Soviet 
life and present it in a Cold War manner to the American public. In the begin-
nings Soviet Studies were funded by government institutions and major private 
foundations so as to present scholarly evidence of a homogeneous Soviet threat 
to the US. One example was the “Harvard refugees interview project” referred to 
as “Russian interview project” (RIP) and paid for by the United States Air Force 
with one million dollars. At the initiative of Frederick Osborn this program was 
designed to figure out what made the new adversary tick. Members of the Truman 
administration felt that they did not understand their Russian counterparts. 
Behavioral sciences should solve the riddle.161 The investigation team interviewed 
Russian displaced persons in Germany to find out whether the Soviet Union was 
stable or likely to break down. The US Air Force wanted a “working model of the 
Soviet social system” and proof of the aggressiveness of a fragile system without 
inner support. 
The findings of the researchers Joseph Berliner and Clyde Kluckhohn refuted 
their funder’s view of the Soviet Union. “In most respects Soviet society reflected 
the characteristics of a class society of the Western industrial kind.”162 The RIP 
did not prove that the Russian society was of socialist nature. Contrary to its loud 
ideological proclamations of a complete lack of historical precedents, the RIP saw 
Russian society as a stable industrial society, in many ways not so different from 
the US. Kluckhohn’s team insisted that the USSR wasn’t on the brink of collapse 
and had wide if not deep support from its citizens. US Forces wouldn’t be greeted 
as liberators.163 Merle Fainsod’s analysis of the Smolensk archive delivered 
another blow to common convictions of the inner fragility of totalitarian party 
rule by a small elite of party rulers in the Kremlin. His findings contradicted the 
Soviet stereotypes in the US almost in every aspect.164
The rise of a generation of post-behaviorist social science scholars in the 
1960s introduced new perspectives and made Cold War social sciences more 
reflective on the Cold War. The center of the research agenda shifted from explor-
161 An equivalent of 9 million $ in 2009.
162 Tony Shaw, “Cinema, Television and the Cold War Introduction,” Journal of British Cinema 
and Television 10, no. 1 (2013): 369; Joseph M. Bochenski, Soviet Russian dialectical materialism 
(Diamat) (Dordrecht, Holland,: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1963), X.
163 David C. Engerman, “Social Science in the Cold War,” Isis 101, no. 2 (2010): 399.
164 James R. Arnold and Roberta Wiener, Cold War. The essential reference guide (Santa Barbara, 
Calif. [u.a.]: ABC-CLIO, 2012); A. L. Adamishin and Richard Schifter, Human rights, perestroika, and 
the end of the cold war (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2009).
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ing the stability, homogeneity and identity of a given society to analyzing social 
inequality, reproduction of social groups and access to political communication. 
Cold War social science transformed into social science of the Cold War, looking 
at the antagonism with its tools and concepts and not taking its methodology 
from a bipolar ideology. 
Soviet studies benefited academic life as much if not more than national 
security. During the 1960s their belief in academic independence and neutral-
ity while simultaneously being funded by the government was undermined. New 
cohorts of experts arrived and the division between the totalitarian and the revi-
sionist approaches grew ever deeper. Soviet studies outgrew the know-your-en-
emy approach, gradually evolving into the study of Russia as an important world 
culture.165 Instead of providing proof for a central control of the Soviet bloc, the 
new research made differences and distinctions visible within Russian society 
and politics. Since the 1960s it served less and less to buttress political claims 
against the enemy. Social scientists replaced anti-Communists in the Russian 
Centers. Sovietology’s political lustre dimmed, when less partisan researchers 
began to make the heterogeneity of Soviet-style societies visible.166 
Social science’s role in the Cold War was ambivalent. First social scientists 
heralded modernization and economic development as key paradigms, but later 
they shied away from such grand narratives. They began to repudiate the teleol-
ogies underlying modernization and the dichotomy of “modern versus premod-
ern/traditional.” Instead plural, hybrid, and non-teleological approaches were 
favored. The competition of blueprints led to the emergence of a model of “mul-
tiple modernities.” Social scientists did not simply defend Western democracy 
and market capitalism, they tried to transform it. Indeed, the Cold War gradually 
became an era of capitalist and communist self-reform.167
What was the impact of this recoding of the Cold War? Cold War culture became 
self-reflexive, it reflected on itself and provided models to put the Cold War into per-
spective. Once self-reflexivity – particularly in the social sciences – was a cognitive 
pattern, bipolar schemes of the Cold War could not be upheld. When in 1979/80 
the political antagonism between East and West sharpened again, political actors 
could not count on the support of the arts and of culture in general. 
165 Elena Osokina, “Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts,” Slavic 
Review 70, no. 1 (2011): 207.
166 Shaw, “Cinema, Television and the Cold War Introduction.”; Engerman.
167 Howard Brick, “Optimism of the Mind: Imagining Postindustrial Society in the 1960s and 
1970s,” American Quarterly 44, no. 3 (1992); Transcending capitalism. Visions of a new society in 
modern American thought (Ithaca [u.a.]: Cornell University Press, 2006).
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4 Conclusion
Different concepts of culture reveal different Cold War cultures. The most common 
notion of culture refers to practices of representation. From this perspective Cold 
War culture was about various ways of representing the actors, the enemies and 
the conflict. These representations focused on competing forms of modernism 
in the East and the West. Representing Modernism in one way or the other was 
therefore a central feature of the cultural Cold War. A second concept of culture 
tries to make visible the production of meaning, the re-coding and re-imagining 
of the Cold War. In this view, Cold War culture wasn’t a function of the conflict, 
but rather a field where its meaning was negotiated. These meanings changed 
over time. The most profound changes were the internalization of the Cold War 
and the reflexivity with which scientists came to look at the antagonism. These 
changes occurred mostly after the Cuban Missile Crisis offered a spectre of world-
wide self-destruction. The Cold War turned into an object of cultural criticism. 
The Cold War cultures were never merely straightforward projections, simple or 
plain reproductions of Western or Eastern ideology. Over time, they entailed dis-
placements, irony, hybridization and tragedy on both sides.168 Due to such prac-
tices of hybridization, bipolar imaginaries such as “East” and “West” or “center 
and periphery” became blurred.169 Sharpening them again ran against consider-
able resistance after 1979.
What did the Cold War produce culturally? What was its lasting impact? The 
Cold War’s influence on Europe was more qualitative than quantitative. “It shaped 
existing disputes and older developments more than it inspired new trends.”170 
The creative potential after 1945 came mostly from actors and movements that 
were only indirectly related to the Cold War, for instance the student rebellion 
in the 1960s or the new ideological debates after the end of the postwar boom in 
1973. The end of the postwar growth produced more new ideas than the preceding 
Cold War confrontation. That becomes even clearer if one compares the cultural 
production of the interwar years with the Cold War, a period of relative peace and 
stability in Western Europe. Classical modernity reached its apogee in the 1920s 
and 30s, while postmodernism triumphed in the 1980s. The cultural Cold War 
168 See Elisabeth Bronfen and Anne Emmert, Hybride Kulturen. Beiträge zur anglo-amerikanischen 
Multikulturalismusdebatte, Stauffenburg discussion (Tübingen: Stauffenburg-Verl., 1997).
169 Vittoria Borsò & Christiane Liermann & Patrick Merziger, “Transfigurationen des Politischen. 
Von Propaganda-Studien zu Interaktionsmodellen der Medienkommunikation – eine Einleitung,” 
in Die Macht des Populären. Politik und populäre Kultur im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Vittoria Borsò & 
Christiane Liermann & Patrick Merziger (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2010), 20f.
170 Gienow-Hecht, 398f.
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in many ways drew on older models and ideas. It hardly overcame them. It used 
them in new ways, assembled them in new assemblages or – to borrow a term 
from Claude Lévi-Strauss – Cold War bricolages.
George Orwell once remarked that the Cold War did generate a vocabulary of 
its own. The lingua belli frigidi knew mostly negative terms that stemmed from its 
bipolar logic. This vocabulary contained invectives like “‘lackeys’, ‘pinkos’, and 
‘running dogs’, ‘fellow-travellers’, ‘cliques’ and ‘deviationists’, ‘card-carrying’, 
‘paper tigers’, ‘henchmen’, ‘stooges’ and ‘revanchists’”. Other terms denoted 
states or cities: ‘Formosa’, ‘Red China’, ‘Beijing’, ‘Pankow’, ‘Leningrad’ or ‘Karl-
Marx-Stadt’, now Chemnitz. The Cold War semantics comprised “central commit-
tees” and ‘Five Year Plans’ as well as ‘Kremlinology’. Historical metaphors were 
held in especially high esteem. Brezhnev and other party leaders often used the 
phrase “History teaches us.” Lenin knew history on his side, when he, “the think-
ing guillotine,” quoted the Latin verse: volentem ducunt, fata nolentem trahunt. 
In October 1989 Mikhail Gorbachev made that the same point by warning that 
“latecomers will be punished by life.”171
171 Fred Halliday, “‘High and just proceedings’: Notes towards an anthology of the Cold War,” 
Millennium-Journal of International Studies 30, no. 3 (2001).
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